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UNMIXING A JURISPRUDENTIAL COCKTAIL:
RECONCILING THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT,
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND
FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISPRUDENCE TO JUDGE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAWS
RESTRICTING DIRECT SHIPMENT OF ALCOHOL
Justin Lemaire*
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution provides that: "The Congress shall have Power
... To regulate Commerce.. . among the several States....,"1 This is
the Interstate Commerce Clause, which affirmatively grants Congress
the power to make all manner of laws regarding matters that touch on
commerce. However, the Supreme Court "long has recognized that
this affirmative grant of authority to Congress also encompasses an
implicit or 'dormant' limitation on the authority of the States to enact
legislation affecting interstate commerce."2 This "dormant Com-
merce Clause" prohibits the states from making regulations that im-
pose serious burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce.
Because of the dormant Commerce Clause, a state could not prevent
its residents from using the internet to order New England lobsters
from Fisherman's Fleet, video games from GameStop, or books from
Amazon.com and having those items delivered to their doors.
Alcohol, however, is different. Most states place some type of re-
striction on the ability of consumers to order liquor and have it
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A.
University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 2002. My thanks go out to all of the members of
the Notre Dame Law Review for their help in preparing this Note for publication. I wish
to thank my parents, Paul and Christine Lemaire, and especially my wife Sarah, for
their guidance and encouragement over the years. Without these special people, my
law school experience would not be possible.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989).
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shipped to their homes.3 If states attempted to place such restrictions
on commerce in lobsters or video games or virtually any other prod-
uct, the courts would not hesitate to strike down those restrictions.
The issue of state imposed restrictions on commerce is more compli-
cated when commerce in alcoholic beverages is involved. Section 2 of
the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution provides: "The trans-
portation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. '4 Its quirks have
been documented, 5 but one thing that the amendment clearly does is
set alcohol apart from any other article of commerce. After all,
neither the Founders nor any Congress ever found it necessary to en-
act a constitutional provision forbidding the violation of state regula-
tions over any other item. What is not clear, however, is precisely to
what extent the amendment makes alcohol different. Does it author-
ize the states to forbid the direct shipment of liquor to consumers?
This issue has become important in recent years because of the
rapid growth of the American wine industry. There are more than
2000 domestic wineries in the United States, up from just 375 in
1963.6 The vast majority of those wineries are small, independent ven-
tures that produce premium wines that sell for $15 per bottle and up.7
Due to their size, such wineries often find it difficult or even impossi-
3 See Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers'Rights, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 1, 27-34 (2000)
(categorizing and explaining the various types of restrictions that states place on the
direct shipment of wine to consumers).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
5 Note that the amendment directly prohibits the conduct it identifies (i.e., im-
portation and transportation of liquors in violation of state laws) rather than merely
allowing the states or Congress to prohibit that conduct. As a result, there are now
two ways that a private citizen not acting under color of law can violate the Constitu-
tion. One is to enslave someone in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and the
other is to violate state liquor control laws. See Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the
Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons From the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced
Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 218-20 (1995).
6 Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce
in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DuKE LJ. 1619, 1622 (2000).
7 See AndrewJ. Kozusko III, Note, The Fight to "Free the Grapes" Enters Federal Court:
Constitutional Challenges to the Validity of State Prohibitions on the Direct Shipment of Alcohol,
20 J.L. & COM. 75, 76 (2000); James Molnar, Comment, Under The Influence: Why Alco-
hol Direct Shipment Laws are a Violation of the Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv.
169, 172-73 (2001); Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, Vintage System: Big Li-
quor Wholesaler Finds Change Stalking Its Very Private World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at
Al.
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ble to sell their wares through traditional state distribution channels.
The Internet, however, provides a convenient connection between
wineries and their potential customers.8 Unfortunately, state direct-
shipment prohibitions often get in the way.
Wineries and wine lovers have challenged state direct-shipment
laws in the courts, claiming that such laws restrain commerce to a de-
gree not allowed by the dormant Commerce Clause. The states
counter that the Twenty-First Amendment gives them the right to en-
force direct-shipment laws. Since 2000, no fewer than five circuit
courts of appeals have considered direct-shipment law challenges.
The interplay between direct-shipment laws, the Twenty-First Amend-
ment, and the dormant Commerce Clause is an issue that may well be
taken up by the Supreme Court in the near future.
This Note attempts to sort out this issue in light of current law.
Part I examines how alcohol regulation has developed in the United
States, which contributes to an understanding of how state regulation
of alcohol has long been considered "different." Part II traces the
development of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence in the
area of alcohol regulation and the Twenty-First Amendment. Part III
reviews the five recent circuit court of appeals decisions regarding the
validity of state direct-shipment laws. Finally, Part IV takes crucial
principles from the Supreme Court and circuit court of appeals deci-
sions and attempts to mold them into a clear understanding about
when state direct-shipment laws are valid and when they are not. This
Note concludes that nondiscriminatory direct-shipment laws are a
valid part of the states' right to structure their own alcohol distribu-
tion systems while discriminatory direct-shipment laws are presumed
to have an improper, protectionist purpose and are invalid unless the
state can affirmatively justify them.
I. THE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES9
Alcohol is unique among articles of commerce in that it is now
primarily regulated by the states.' 0 This has not always been the case,
8 See, e.g., Kozusko, supra note 7, at 76 (noting the use by boutique wineries of
both direct mail and the Internet to reach customers across the United States).
9 This Note provides only a general overview of the history of alcohol regulation
in the United States. For a much more detailed history, see generally Sidney J.
Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor:
Accomodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REv. 161, 164-86 (1991) (tracing
developments in alcohol regulations across the United States from the early
nineteenth century to Prohibition and beyond).
10 SeeJohn Foust, Note, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act, 41 B.C.
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however. Throughout much of U.S. history, the federal government
and the states engaged in a game of push-and-shove over alcohol regu-
lation. 11 The outcome of this battle was not determined until the rati-
fication of the Twenty-First Amendment, and the ongoing controversy
over direct-shipping laws indicates that there are some aspects of the
outcome that remain unsettled.
A. Early Pre-Prohibition Regulation
During the 1800s, alcohol was regulated virtually exclusively at
the state and local levels. 12 Early temperance movements were fueled
primarily by the unseemly (and probably exaggerated) image of the
saloon and the evils that came with it.13 As pro-temperance forces
gained strength, their focus shifted from moral persuasion aimed at
the drinker to suppression of the alcohol supply through political
means.14 Eventually, temperance forces succeeded in convincing thir-
teen out of the thirty-one states to pass laws banning the saloon and
prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. 15 However, by
the time of the Civil War, eight of those thirteen states saw their laws
struck down by state courts, and the temperance movement faded
while the country turned to confront more pressing concerns. 16
After the Civil War, the temperance movement returned and
once again galvanized support. Powerful temperance societies
emerged, led by the Anti-Saloon League. 17 The movement focused
primarily on state and local laws. Kansas became the first prohibition
state by amending its constitution in 1880 to go completely dry.' 8 The
Supreme Court upheld this move, finding that the absolute prohibi-
tion of the manufacture and sale of alcohol was within the state's po-
lice powers.' 9 However, the next year, the Court qualified the states'
L. REV. 659, 661 (2000); see also RICHARD McGowAN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE
ALCOHOL INDUSTRY 4-5, 113 (1997) (describing the structure of state and local agen-
cies that tax and control alcohol in the United States).
11 See Foust, supra note 10, at 662.
12 Spaeth, supra note 9, at 165.
13 Clayton L. Silvernail, Comment, Smoke, Mirrors and Myopia: How the States Are
Able to Pass Unconstitutional Laws Against the Direct Shipping of Wine in Interstate Commerce,
44 S. TEX. L. REv. 499, 505 (2003); Spaeth, supra note 9, at 166-67.
14 See Spaeth, supra note 9, at 168.
15 Silvernail, supra note 13, at 505.
16 Spaeth, supra note 9, at 169.
17 Id. at 170.
18 Silvernail, supra note 13, at 505-06; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 171.
19 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887). The police power is the power
of a state that "extend[s] to the protection of the lives, health, and property of the
citizens, and to the preservation of good order, and the public morals." Beer Co. v.
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power to regulate alcohol somewhat, holding that states could not reg-
ulate intoxicating spirits until the liquor was physically delivered into
the state, because regulation of interstate commerce was within Con-
gress's exclusive domain. Thus, a state could not prevent introduction
of liquor by transportation from another state, even though the state
could prohibit the sale of the liquor once it arrived.20
Two years later, the Court went even further. In Leisy v. Hardin,21
the Court held that liquor remained an article of interstate commerce
as long as it stayed in its original package or container.2 2 Therefore,
the state could not seize such liquor or take any other action to pre-
vent its sale. 23 Strangely, this created a situation where states were
forced to discriminate against in-state liquor industries, as states could
ban internal production, transportation, and sale, but could not stop
out-of-state liquor in its original package from being imported and
sold. 24 Even prohibition states were thrown open to sales by "agency"
stores offering imported liquor in its original package. 25
B. Congress Secures Regulatory Power for the States
The effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Mugler, Bowman,
and Leisy was to give the states "carte blanche" regulatory power over
alcohol produced within the state, but to leave states helpless to keep
imported alcohol out or even to prevent the sale of imported liquor so
long as it remained in its original package. 26 The states and the tem-
perance groups turned to Congress, and Congress responded quickly,
passing the Wilson Act the very same year that the Supreme Court
handed down the Leisy decision. 27 The Wilson Act states that all li-
quor transported into any state is subject to the laws of the state to the
same extent that it would be if the liquor had been manufactured in
the state, regardless of whether the liquor is still in its original pack-
Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877). For a detailed analysis of the police power, see
generally Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
429 (2004) (exploring the proper extent of the police power and contending that the
Constitution contains discernable limits on the extent to which states may exercise
the police power).
20 Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 499-500 (1888).
21 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
22 Id. at 124-25.
23 See id.
24 See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000); Russ
Miller, Note, The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-First Amendment and State Laws Against
the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VANDI. L. REv. 2495, 2506 (2001).
25 See Spaeth, supra note 9, at 172.
26 See Silvernail, supra note 13, at 507-08.
27 Foust, supra note 10, at 663; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 172.
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age.2 8 The Wilson Act withstood constitutional challenge 29 and the
states were able to close down the agencies. 30
Victory was short lived for the states and the prohibitionists.
Soon, alcohol purveyors began circumventing state laws by offering
liquor through mail order.31 The Supreme Court facilitated the mail
order liquor business by its rulings in two cases. In Rhodes v. Iowa,32
the Supreme Court held that state prohibition laws did not apply until
alcohol carried in interstate commerce was delivered to the con-
signee.33 Naturally, this would make it very difficult for a state to en-
force its prohibition laws against mail order alcohol unless the state
could post agents at its citizens' houses to inspect the packages those
citizens received. The Supreme Court went even further in Vance v.
WA. Vandercook & Co.,3 4 stating that "the right of persons in one State
to ship liquor into another State to a resident for his own use is de-
rived from the Constitution of the United States, and does not rest on
the grant of the state law."'35 Predictably, the mail order liquor indus-
try flourished.3 6
Once again, the states and the temperance forces had to turn to
Congress. And although it took a little bit longer this time, Congress
again responded, led by Senator Kenyon of Iowa.3 7 The Webb-Ken-
yon Act prohibits the transport of intoxicating liquor into any state for
any use that would violate the laws of that state. 38 Thus, Congress
effectively restricted the movement of alcohol in interstate commerce
and prohibition states were able to keep liquor out. The Supreme
Court subsequently upheld the Act's approach. 39 Thus, state power to
regulate alcohol was secured-with the help of Congress.
28 Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C.
§ 121 (2000)).
29 See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891).
30 See Spaeth, supra note 9, at 172.
31 Foust, supra note 10, at 662-63; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 172.
32 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
33 Id. at 421-23.
34 170 U.S. 438 (1898).
35 Id. at 452-53.
36 Silvernail, supra note 13, at 511; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 173.
37 See Foust, supra note 10, at 663; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 173.
38 Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified as amended at 27
U.S.C. § 122 (2000)).
39 Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 325-32 (1917).
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C. The Return to National Regulation: Prohibition
Rather than being appeased, the temperance forces were em-
boldened by Congress's accommodation of their ends. Prohibitionists
pushed to expand prohibition nationwide. 40  December of 1917
brought the proposal of national prohibition. 4 1 By 1919, the states
had ratified national prohibition, and Prohibition was enshrined in
the Constitution as the Eighteenth Amendment.4 2 The amendment
banned the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating li-
quors," as well as importation and exportation of liquors, in all terri-
tory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.4 3 Congress and
the states were given concurrent authority to enact laws implementing
Prohibition.44 Thus, liquor regulation was no longer the exclusive do-
main of the states.
Prohibition did not work.4 5 In 1933, an amendment to repeal
Prohibition was introduced to Congress. 46 By the end of that same
year, the amendment had been approved by Congress, ratified by the
states, and added to the Constitution as the Twenty-First Amend-
ment.47 Two out of the three sections of the amendment are simple-
Section 1 repeals the Eighteenth Amendment, 48 while Section 3 set a
seven year time limit for ratification. 49 Section 2, however, is not
nearly as clear.
D. Section Two of The Twenty-First Amendment: Returning Power
to the States-But How Much?
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment reads: "The transporta-
tion or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
40 Spaeth, supra note 9, at 174-75.
41 S.J. Res. 17, 65th Cong., 40 Star. 1050 (1917).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
43 Id. § l.
44 Id. § 2. Congress enacted a comprehensive statutory regime to implement and
enforce prohibition. Primary authority to enforce prohibition was given to the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue. See National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305
(1919), amended in part and repealed in part by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement
Act, ch. 740, 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
45 See generally Spaeth, supra note 9, at 176-80 (providing a concise but compre-
hensive summary of the many failings of Prohibition).
46 S.J. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 76 CONG. REC. 4138 (1933).
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
48 See id. § 1.
49 See id. § 3.
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violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."50 This provision
obviously gives some control over liquor regulation to the states, but
just how far that control extends has been the subject of intense
debate.
There are two main views of how the Twenty-First Amendment
should be interpreted.51 One can be described as the "absolutist"
view. Those who adhere to this view believe that Section 2 vests com-
plete, plenary regulatory power over alcoholic beverages in the
states.52 Under this view, state liquor regulations are exempt from any
limitations from the federal level. On the other side is the "federalist"
view. This view holds that Section 2 only existed to protect those
states that chose to remain dry. States that allowed the importation,
manufacture, or sale of alcoholic drinks gained no new power vis-a±-vis
the federal government. 53 Under this view of Section 2, state liquor
regulations are subject to federal limitations on state power like the
Commerce Clause.
The debate over the meaning of Section 2 is fueled by the
Twenty-First Amendment itself, which yields few clues. The text is
often cited by absolutists as supporting their view, 54 but federalists can
easily point out that the amendment only proscribes transporting or
importing alcoholic beverages into a state in violation of its laws.
Nothing in the text explicitly expands state power to regulate liquor
beyond the scope of the authority the states would otherwise have. 55
The text, then, does not settle the dispute over the meaning of Sec-
tion 2.
50 Id.§2.
51 A third view that has been expressed is that Section 2 simply constitutionalized
the Webb-Kenyon Act. This view is based on the language of Section 2, which more
or less mirrors the content of the Act and has been used to support positions that can
be characterized as leaning toward absolutism, as well as positions that lean toward
federalism. Compare Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir.
2000) ("Section 2 tracks the Webb-Kenyon Act and effectively incorporates its ap-
proach into the Constitution.... No longer may the dormant commerce clause be
read to protect interstate shipments of liquor from regulation ...."), with Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976) ("The wording of § 2 closely follows the Webb-
Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers' clear intention of constitutionaliz-
ing the Commerce Clause framework established under those statutes.").
52 Silvernail, supra note 13, at 513; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 181. The first use of
the terms "absolutist" and "federalist" to describe the conflicting views of the Twenty-
First Amendment appears to have been in Michael E. Loomis, Note, Federal District
Court Exempts Interstate Rail Carrier From State Open Saloon Prohibition, 6 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 249, 252-53 (1972).
53 Spaeth, supra note 9, at 181.
54 See Foust, supra note 10, at 679.
55 See Douglass, supra note 6, at 1630.
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The legislative history of the Twenty-First Amendment can also be
seen as supporting both the federalist and the absolutist viewpoints.
Senator John James Blaine of Wisconsin, the Senate sponsor of the
bill, stated that the "purpose of section 2 is to restore to the States by
constitutional amendment absolute control in effect over interstate
commerce affecting intoxicating liquors which enter the confines of
the States."56 Commentators use this statement and others like it to
support the absolutist view. 5 7 Absolutists also commonly point out
that the proposed amendment originally included a fourth section
(which was actually proposed as section 3) that would have given Con-
gress concurrent power to regulate liquor. 58 That provision was voted
out of the statute, with some Senators expressing concern that such a
provision would be contrary to the amendment's purpose "to restore
to the States control of their liquor problem."59 This, absolutists say,
further proves that the Twenty-First Amendment was meant to give
the states control of liquor regulation free from any federal
interference. 60
The legislative history, however, does not lend unbroken support
to the absolutist position. Other elements of the legislative history can
be seen as supporting the federalist view. For example, Senator
Blaine, while reporting on the amendment for the Senate Judiciary
Committee, stated that Section 2 was present "to assure the so-called
dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those
States." 61 Other Senators made comments that can also be inter-
preted as making protection for the dry states the central purpose of
Section 2.62 Nevertheless, it is Senator Blaine's statement that com-
mentators most often cite as creating doubt about whether the pur-
pose of Section 2 was to give the states absolute authority to regulate
56 76 CONG. REC. 4143 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
57 See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 356 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 337-38
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's review of the legislative history of the
Twenty-First Amendment in his Hostetter dissent is especially interesting because Jus-
tice Black was present during the ratification of the amendment as a Senator, appar-
ently siding with the absolutists. See 76 CONG. REC. 4177-78 (1933) (statement of Sen.
Black).
58 S.J. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 76 CONG. REc. 4138 (1933).
59 76 CONG. REc. 4145 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
60 See, e.g., Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 337 (Black, J., dissenting).
61 76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
62 See, e.g., id. at 4176 (statement of Sen. Borah) ("[W]e can [not] afford to strip
the amendment of all effort to protect the dry States."); id. at 4171 (statement of Sen.
Robinson) ("[T]he Senate [is not asked] to put itself in the position of denying any
measure of protection to dry territory.").
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alcohol or whether Section 2 was merely intended to provide protec-
tion for the dry states.63
E. State Laws After Prohibition-Absolute Regulatory Authority
While there is plenty of material to fuel the debate over the
meaning of the Twenty-First Amendment, the states showed little in-
terest in debating. Instead, the states set out to put their post-Prohibi-
tion liquor regulations into place. Most states64 chose to implement a
three-tier system, where all liquor must pass from producer to whole-
saler to retailer, and only then on to consumers. No owner may own
an interest in more than one tier, and the states regulate each tier
individually.65 Direct-shipment laws fit into this system, since a pro-
ducer who ships alcohol directly to consumers bypasses the regulatory
structure. One of the purposes of the three-tier system was to keep
the alcoholic beverage industry out of the hands of the organized
crime syndicates that controlled the industry during Prohibition.66
There are other important purposes, however. The detailed regula-
tory structure, with its checks on vertical and horizontal market inte-
gration, allows the states to ensure orderly markets and avoid a return
to the saloon. 67 Moreover, the regulatory structure facilitates state col-
lection of tax revenues. 68 With these purposes in mind, the states put
their regulatory systems into place.
Of course, states issued regulations that went beyond this bare
three-tier structure and direct shipping restrictions. Many states' laws
clearly revealed that, in the minds of state legislators, Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment gave the states absolute authority to regulate
liquor. Early Supreme Court decisions supported that view. 69 In State
Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.,70 the Supreme Court up-
held a California law that required wholesalers who dealt in imported
63 See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1984); Martin, supra
note 3, at 14; Douglass, supra note 6, at 1632.
64 This is not to say that all states chose this general structure. Some states, for
example, chose to implement monopolies whereby the state government acts as
wholesaler, distributor, and retailer. Foust, supra note 10, at 666.
65 See Susan Lorde Martin, Changing the Law: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.L. &
POL. 63, 63-64 (2001); Martin, supra note 3, at 27-28; Foust, supra note 10, at 666.
66 Martin, supra note 65, at 64; Martin, supra note 3, at 27; Freedman & Emshwil-
ler, supra note 7.
67 See Martin, supra note 65, at 64; Martin, supra note 3, at 28.
68 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990); Bridenbaugh v.
Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000); Max Garrone, How to Get a Bou-
tique Zinfandel from California to Texas, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 65, 65.
69 See Silvernail, supra note 13, at 515-16.
70 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
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beer to obtain a separate importer's permit in addition to the general
wholesaler's permit.7' Reading the text of Section 2 of the Twenty-
First Amendment, the Court determined: "The words used are apt to
confer upon the State the power to forbid all importations which do
not comply with the conditions which it prescribes." 72 Therefore, the
Court interpreted Section 2 essentially as an exception to the Com-
merce Clause.73
The Court continued to adhere to the absolutist position in other
Twenty-First Amendment cases following Young's Market. In Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp.,74 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that abso-
lutely prohibited wholesalers from importing any brand of liquor that
contained more than 25% alcohol and had not been registered with
the U.S. Patent Office. 75 Local brands were subject to no such regula-
tion.76 Although the law obviously discriminated against interstate
commerce, the Court held that "discrimination against imported li-
quor is permissible although it is not an incident of reasonable regula-
tion of the liquor traffic. ' 77 Mahoney made it clear that state
regulations of alcoholic beverages were not even subject to a reasona-
bleness requirement.
In Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves,78 the Court upheld a complex Kentucky
statute that touched absolutely every stage of the liquor trade, includ-
ing manufacture, storage, sale, purchase, transportation (in import or
export), and even possession.79 Participation in any of these phases
was only allowed subject to the terms explicitly set out in the statute. 0
The Court reasoned that if the states had the power to completely
prohibit all phases of the liquor trade, the states could also choose the
less restrictive course of allowing those same activities under statuto-
rily prescribed conditions: "The greater power includes the less."8 I
71 Id. at 62-64. To more fully understand the case, it should be realized that
importers were not merely subject to a trivial additional fee; the general wholesaler's
permit cost $50. Importers were required to pay an additional $500 for the privilege
of importing beer. Id. at 60-61.
72 Id. at 62.
73 See Silvernail, supra note 13, at 515; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 183.
74 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
75 Id. at 402.
76 Id. at 403.
77 Id.
78 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
79 Id. at 134.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 138.
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After Ziffrin, it was apparent that the states' absolute power extended
to all phases of the traffic in spirituous beverages.8 2
These cases show that in the early post-Prohibition years, there
was no question that the Twenty-First Amendment gave the states ab-
solute power to regulate alcohol. State alcohol regulations were not
subject to the Commerce Clause or any other restriction from the fed-
eral level. The constitutionality of direct-shipment laws would hardly
be worth discussing. This would not be the case forever. Soon, cracks
began to appear in the foundation of the absolutist interpretation of
the Twenty-First Amendment. 83 In 1945, the Supreme Court's view of
the interaction between the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First
Amendment began to evolve.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLUTION TowARD AccOMODATION
Since the early post-Prohibition cases, the Supreme Court's view
of the interaction between the Twenty-First Amendment has evolved
into what has been described as an "accommodation approach."8 4
This approach is best encapsulated by the words of Justice Stewart:
"Both the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause are
parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitu-
tion, each must be considered in the light of the other, and in the
context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. '"85
This did not occur quickly, but was truly an evolution. Over the years,
the Supreme Court has apparently come to embrace an approach that
calls many state liquor regulations, including direct-shipment laws,
into doubt.
82 At least one commentator has cited Ziffrin as the first sign of the Supreme
Court's move away from the absolutist view of the Twenty-First Amendment, stating
that the Ziffrin Court appears to apply a reasonableness test to Kentucky's regulatory
scheme. Spaeth, supra note 9, at 184. While the Court in Ziffrin noted that Ken-
tucky's scheme was "not unreasonable and clearly ... appropriate for effectuating the
policy of limiting traffic in order to minimize well-known evils," Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at
139, the Court did not indicate that its holding was contingent on this finding. All of
the other language in the decision is consistent with the broad view of the Twenty-
First Amendment that was characteristic of that time.
83 See Silvernail, supra note 13, at 519-22.
84 See Foust, supra note 10, at 681-82; Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment
Laws, the Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REv. 353, 374-75
(1999); Spaeth, supra note 9, at 186.
85 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964).
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A. The Retreat From the Absolutist View to the Accommodation Approach
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.8 6 was the first case where
the Supreme Court began to back away from the absolutist position . 7
Frankfort Distilleries was not a Commerce Clause case, although it did
involve a restraint on trade. The respondents were producers, whole-
salers, and retailers who were accused of engaging in various activities
to perpetrate a price-fixing scheme and compel others to do the same,
violating the Sherman Act.88 Even though the aim of the scheme was
only to fix prices local to Colorado, the Court found that the scheme
reached beyond the boundaries of Colorado, as the participants
sought to compel alcohol producers outside of Colorado to enter into
illegal price maintenance contracts. 89 Therefore, the Sherman Act
applied to the respondents' price-fixing scheme.
More importantly for present purposes, the respondents tried to
argue that the state's power to regulate liquor trafficking within its
boundaries rendered the Sherman Act inapplicable.90 The Court re-
sponded that the Twenty-First Amendment "has not given the states
plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct of persons doing
an interstate liquor business outside their boundaries."91 The federal
government, then, had the authority to prosecute the respondents,
because they were interstate liquor businesses that engaged in trade
outside of Colorado and tried to influence the activities of other inter-
state actors in the liquor trade.92 Because the Sherman Act was not
being enforced in violation of any affirmative law of Colorado, the
prosecution could stand.93 For the first time since the end of Prohibi-
tion, the Court recognized that federal authority could reach the alco-
hol trade. 94
One should not get carried away with the sweep of the Frankfort
Distilleries decision. It did not affirmatively limit the states' ability to
pass alcohol regulations. All it really stated was that there is no "dor-
mant Twenty-First Amendment" principle that prevents the federal
86 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
87 See Silvernail, supra note 13, at 517-18; Spaeth, supa note 9, at 185.
88 Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 294-95.
89 Id. at 298. This finding was necessary because Congress passed the Sherman
Act in exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the Court had
held in previous cases that the Act did not apply to purely local conduct, as purely
local conduct does not affect commerce among the states. Id. at 297.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 299.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Silvernail, supra note 13, at 518.
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government from regulating the activities of those engaged in, or at-
tempting to affect, the interstate liquor trade. In fact, the Court reaf-
firmed that the states have "full authority to determine the conditions
upon which liquor can come into its territory and what will be done
with it after it gets there. '95 The closest the Court came to even think-
ing about affirmatively limiting state power under the Twenty-First
Amendment was when it noted that this was not a case where the
Sherman Act was applied contrary to the regulatory policy of a state.
The Court, however, declined to consider what would happen in such
a case. 96 So while Frankfort Distilleries was a step towards softening the
Court's view of the scope of the Twenty-First Amendment, it was only a
baby step.
One year later, in Nippert v. City of Richmond,97 the Supreme Court
gave the first real indication that it might be amenable to finding af-
firmative limits on state power under the Twenty-First Amendment.98
Nippert was a Commerce Clause case, though not a Twenty-First
Amendment case. It dealt with the constitutionality of a municipal
ordinance that placed a license tax on solicitors.99 In a footnote to its
discussion, the Court stated:
[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the
Twenty-first Amendment gives the states the highest degree of con-
trol, is not altogether beyond the reach of the federal commerce
power, at any rate when the State's regulation squarely conflicts
with regulation imposed by Congress governing interstate trade or
traffic .... 100
Leaving aside the fact that this comment is dicta located in a foot-
note, and that it cites Frankfort Distilleries for a point that the Frankfort
Distilleries Court specifically declined to discuss, 1° 1 the Supreme Court
indicated for the first time that state liquor regulations might be sub-
ject to affirmative limits from the federal level. Still, no such limits
had yet been applied to an actual state regulation.
Such limits were applied in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp. 0 2 As its full name might indicate, Idlewild was in the business of
selling wine and liquors to departing passengers (and departing pas-
95 Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 299.
96 Id.
97 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
98 Silvernail, supra note 13, at 518-19; Spaeth, supra note 9, at 185.
99 Nippert, 327 U.S. at 417.
100 Id. at 425 n.15 (citing Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 293).
101 See supra text accompanying note 96.
102 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
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sengers only) at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport. 103 The bottles
that the passenger ordered were delivered to the plane and given to
the passenger only when the passenger arrived at the point of destina-
tion. 10 4 All aspects of Idlewild's business, from wholesale order, to
receipt, to retail sale were conducted under the supervision of the Bu-
reau of Customs.' 0 5 A few weeks after Idlewild opened, the New York
State Liquor Authority informed Idlewild that its business was illegal
under the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws as an unli-
censed and unlicensable business. Idlewild challenged those laws as
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.1 06
The Court framed the issue very narrowly. According to Justice
Stewart, who authored the opinion:
[T] he basic issue we face is whether the Twenty-First Amendment so
far obliterates the Commerce Clause as to empower New York to
prohibit absolutely the passage of liquor through its territory, under
the supervision of the United States Bureau of Customs acting
under federal law, for delivery to customers in foreign countries. 10 7
After reviewing the early post-Prohibition cases, Justice Stewart
made a point that would not be obvious from reading those cases.10 8
According to Justice Stewart, to conclude from those cases that the
Twenty-First Amendment "repealed" the Commerce Clause with re-
gard to state regulation of alcohol would "be an absurd oversimplifica-
tion."10 9 The idea that Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign liquor commerce struck Justice Stew-
art and the Court as "patently bizarre" and "demonstrably
incorrect.""10
Even with this said, the Twenty-First Amendment still appears in
the Constitution and must be given effect. It is here that Justice Stew-
art articulated the accommodation approach: "Both the Twenty-first
Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Consti-
tution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be con-
sidered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and
interests at stake in any concrete case."'' The opinion, however, says
little about the mechanics of this process. The Court emphasized that
103 Id. at 325.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 325-26.
106 Id. at 326-27.
107 Id. at 329.
108 See supra Part I.E.
109 Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 331-32.
110 Id. at 332.
111 Id.
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"ultimate delivery and use is not in New York, but in a foreign coun-
try."' 12 Nor was New York seeking to regulate or control the passage
of alcohol through the state in order to prevent illegal diversion into
New York's internal commerce, which the Court assumed the state
would still have full power to do.' 13 In the eyes of the Court, all New
York really did was prevent business from being transacted under a
law passed by Congress in exercise of the Commerce Power-which
naturally is unconstitutional.' 1 4
The reasoning behind the Court's decision reveals why the Court
framed the issue so narrowly. The basis for the Court's holding was
not that New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws unconstitution-
ally regulated the alcoholic beverage trade within New York. Because
the liquor Idlewild sold was not to be delivered or used in New York, it
was held to be beyond the reach of New York law, and thus protected
by the Commerce Clause. In effect, New York was trying to prevent
"the passage of liquor through its territory."115 Still, Hostetter is ex-
tremely significant as the first time since Prohibition that the Supreme
Court held that the Commerce Clause prevented a state from regulat-
ing liquor industry transactions within the state, and as the first time
the Court articulated the accommodation test. The states were being
put on notice that their alcohol regulations would face limits based on
federal authority.
112 Id. at 333. The Court referred to Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S.
518 (1938), a case which held that California's liquor control laws did not apply in a
national park because delivery and use of any intoxicants was to take place in the
park-which was subject to federal sovereignty, as opposed to state sovereignty. Id. at
538. Nor could the state interfere with shipments to the park. Id. at 539. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind, however, that the operative fact was that the locus of delivery
and sale was a national park. Therefore, Collins did not speak to the limits of a state's
Twenty-First Amendment powers over transactions within the state.
113 Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 333.
114 Id. at 334. Idlewild's business plan was explicitly approved by the Bureau of
Customs under the Tariff Act of 1930. Id. at 326-27.
115 Id. at 329. Justice Black, joined by Justice Goldberg, objected vigorously to the
Court's characterization of the case. Justice Black said that New York had the right to
regulate Idlewild's business because the Twenty-First Amendment gave New York ex-
clusive jurisdiction to regulate "all liquor business carried on in New York." Id. at 335
(Black, J., dissenting). To Justice Black, this clearly encompassed Idlewild's business,
because Idlewild was making sales within New York and was undeniably competing
with New York liquor merchants; in short, it was carrying out liquor business in New
York. Allowing such a business to go unregulated under New York law amounted to
interference with that state's Twenty-First Amendment regulatory power, regardless of
whether that business was approved by the Customs Bureau. Id. at 339 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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After Hostetter, the Supreme Court applied the accommodation
approach to reconcile state liquor regulations against other constitu-
tional provisions besides the Commerce Clause. l l 6 The Court used
the accommodation approach to analyze state liquor statutes that con-
flicted with the Import-Export Clause 1 7 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." l8 It is important to note,
however, that there were indications that the Twenty-First Amend-
ment offers state regulations more protection against Commerce
Clause limitations than limitations imposed by other constitutional
provisions. 1 9 This makes sense in light of the fact that Section 2 of
the Twenty-First Amendment deals with "transportation and importa-
tion," which can be described as commerce-type behavior. Even so, in
the post-Hostetter world, the Twenty-First Amendment was by no means
a free pass for state liquor regulations that the Supreme Court would
honor against the Commerce Clause in all cases.
B. The Substance of Accommodation: The "Core Purposes" Test
While Hostetter called for the Twenty-First Amendment to be con-
sidered "in light of' other constitutional provisions, 120 it did not defin-
itively state how such a process would work. Indeed, the Hostetter
Court appeared to indicate that courts might have to proceed differ-
ently in each case, and conduct the inquiry "in the context of the is-
sues and interests at stake in any concrete case."'1 2 1 Nonetheless,
courts and many commentators have come to recognize the develop-
ment of what is termed a "core purposes" test, under which courts
must inquire whether the state interests served by a challenged liquor
regulation are sufficiently similar to the concerns that motivated the
Twenty-First Amendment to justify upholding the regulation despite
116 See Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Com-
merce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 297, 324-25 (2002); Martin, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing cases
analyzing state liquor regulations in light of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; see Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling
Co., 377 U.S. 341, 344-46 (1964) (holding that a Kentucky tax of ten cents per gallon
on imported liquor could not be applied to liquor imported from abroad).
118 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-09
(1976) (striking down an Oklahoma law that allowed the sale of low alcohol content
beer to women at age eighteen, but not to men below the age of twenty-one).
119 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 206 ("Once passing beyond consideration of the Com-
merce Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional
provisions becomes increasingly doubtful.").
120 Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332.
121 Id.
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an apparent conflict with the Commerce Clause or another constitu-
tional provision. 122
The Supreme Court was faced with applying the Hostetter accom-
modation principle in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.1 23 The Court held that California's liquor resale price
maintenance scheme could not be sustained against a challenge
under the Sherman Act. 124 To reach that conclusion, the Court first
had to reconcile the Twenty-First Amendment with the Sherman
Act. 125 The Court did so by balancing the state and federal interests at
stake in the case. Citing several cases, the Court determined that "the
national policy in favor of competition is both familiar and substan-
tial,"126 and that the Sherman Act was a vital part of that national pol-
icy. 12 7 On the other side of the balance, the Court basically adopted
the California Supreme Court's finding that there was little correla-
tion between the state's purported interests (temperance and orderly
market conditions) and the resale price maintenance scheme. 128 The
Court concluded that "[t] he unsubstantiated state concerns put for-
ward in this case simply are not of the same stature as the goals of the
Sherman Act."' 29 Therefore, the California pricing scheme fell.
Though it can fairly be said that Midcal "further eroded whatever
state power remained under the Twenty-first Amendment,"130 there
are also aspects of the decision that limit its applicability to state di-
rect-shipment laws. First, the Midcal Court was considering "the ex-
tent to which Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate
122 See, e.g., Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley,
325 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1112 (11th
Cir. 2002); Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193, 203-04
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Douglass, supra note 6, at 1642; Kozusko, supra note 7, at 93;
Shanker, supra note 84, at 375.
123 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
124 Id. at 114.
125 Although Hostetter only stated that the Twenty-First Amendment must be rec-
onciled with other constitutional provisions, Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332, the Midcal Court
nevertheless proceeded to reconcile the Twenty-First Amendment with the Sherman
Act, a statute. The Court addressed this seeming disconnect by invoking the Com-
merce Clause, finding that "Congress 'exercis[ed] all the power it possessed' under
the Commerce Clause when it approved the Sherman Act." Midcal, 445 U.S. at 111
(quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932)). But
see Denning, supra note 116, at 326 (finding the Supreme Court's explanation for
balancing the Twenty-First Amendment with a mere statute lacking).
126 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110.
127 Id. at 110-11.
128 Id. at 112-13.
129 Id. at 114.
130 Denning, supra note 116, at 325.
1630 [VOL- 79:4
UNMIXING A JURISPRUDENTIAL COCKTAIL
commerce power,'' 1 because the Sherman Act was passed pursuant
to the commerce power. The precise issue in Midcal, then, was the
extent to which the Twenty-First Amendment took the power to regu-
late alcohol away from Congress, and not the extent to which the
Twenty-First Amendment gave regulatory power to the states that would
otherwise be denied to them under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The latter, and not the former, is the issue when considering state
direct-shipment laws. More importantly, the Midcal Court acknowl-
edged that "[t] he Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually
complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor
and how to structure the liquor distribution system."' 32 It is only
"other liquor regulations ... [that] may be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations."1 33 Thus, to the extent that
direct-shipping laws are a regulation of the structure of the state li-
quor distribution system, 134 they would not be subject to the Midcal
balancing test but would be under the virtually complete control of
the state.
Four years later, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, the Court used
its balancing test to strike down an Oklahoma law prohibiting the
broadcast of certain alcoholic beverage advertisements. 35 The Court
struck down the law in the face of a conflict with FCC regulations. 136
The constitutional provision that had to be reconciled with the state
law in this case was the Supremacy Clause. 13 7 The Court employed
the Midcal balancing test to determine "whether the interests impli-
cated by [the] state regulation are so closely related to the powers
reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may pre-
vail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with ex-
press federal policies."' 38 The results of the balancing test were very
similar to those in Midcal. Even after assuming that restrictions on
131 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 108.
132 Id. at 110.
133 Id. The Court did not define precisely what it meant by "appropriate situa-
tions." See Molnar, supra note 7, at 183. However, the Court is presumably talking
about cases where the state interests served by the challenged alcohol regulation out-
weigh the competing federal interests. This conclusion is supported by the fact that
the next sentence in the decision articulates the Court's balancing test: "The compet-
ing state and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those
concerns in a 'concrete case."' Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964)).
134 See infra Part IV.B.1.
135 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715-16 (1984).
136 Id. at 708.
137 Id. at 712-16.
138 Id. at 714.
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liquor advertising represented a reasonable means of promoting tem-
perance, the Court noted that Oklahoma's advertising restrictions
were directed very narrowly at wine commercials on out-of-state cable
stations and did not reach beer solicitations in print or on broadcast
stations, nor did they reach any liquor advertisement printed outside
of Oklahoma. 139 This made it easy for the Court to find that
Oklahoma's interests were insubstantial and that the challenged regu-
lation was only indirectly related to the power granted to the states in
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment. 40 Thus, the statute was
invalidated in light of the conflict with federal laws.
Capital Cities added very little to the Supreme Court's Twenty-First
Amendment jurisprudence. 141 Its main contribution was solidifying
the Midcal balancing approach. The Court made a much more sub-
stantive contribution in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,142 which has been
characterized as the "most significant decision to date interpreting the
interplay between the Twenty-First Amendment and the Dormant
Commerce Clause."'143 This is almost certainly correct. Since Bacchus,
nearly every other case addressing the effect of the Twenty-First
Amendment on the dormant Commerce Clause has referenced the
Bacchus analysis. 144
139 Id. at 715.
140 Id.
141 Capital Cities could be cited for its addition of the Supremacy Clause to the list
of constitutional provisions with which the Twenty-First Amendment must be recon-
ciled. This means that a state liquor regulation could possibly be struck down if it
conflicts with any federal statute, not just a constitutional provision. However, the
Court struck down a liquor regulation that conflicted with a statute in Midcal as well.
While the Midcal Court invoked the Commerce Clause, the California law it struck
down did not conflict with the Commerce Clause, but with the Sherman Act, a statute
passed under the power given to Congress by the Commerce Clause. Thus, it could
be said that the Court in Midcal was relying on the Supremacy Clause even if it did not
say so. Also, it could be said that Capital Cities added the inquiry into whether the
challenged state liquor law is "closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-
first Amendment." Id. at 714. This, however, is not much different from the Midcal
Court's recognition that states have virtually complete control over whether to allow
the importation or sale of liquor and how to regulate the liquor distribution system
(closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-First Amendment), but less free-
dom to pass other types of alcohol regulations (not closely related to the powers re-
served by the Twenty-First Amendment). See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980).
142 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
143 Douglass, supra note 6, at 1640.
144 See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990); cases cited supra,
note 122.
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Bacchus addressed a Hawaii liquor tax that included exemptions
for Hawaiian-made fruit wines and okolehao, a brandy distilled from
the root of shrubs indigenous to Hawaii.' 45 The appellants were
wholesalers who alleged that the Hawaiian tax was unconstitutional
because it violated the Commerce Clause, among other provisions. 46
First, the Court set out to determine whether the Hawaiian tax vio-
lated the Commerce Clause. The Court had little difficulty making
that determination, restating the principle that where state legislation
effects "simple economic protectionism," a strict rule of invalidity is
imposed.1 47 A finding that state legislation amounts to protectionism,
the Court reasoned, can be made on the basis of either discriminatory
purpose or discriminatory effect. 148 In this case, the Court did not
have to guess at Hawaii's purpose because the state did not dispute
that the purpose of the tax exemption was to aid Hawaiian industry.1 49
The exemption also had a discriminatory effect, because it applied
only to locally produced liquors, although not to all locally produced
liquors. 15 0
Next, the Court addressed Hawaii's argument that the exemption
was nonetheless "saved" by the Twenty-First Amendment. 15' Looking
back at past Twenty-First Amendment cases, the Court found that,
"[i] t is by now clear that the Amendment did not entirely remove state
regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce
Clause.' 52 After citing Midcal, the Court determined: "The question
in this case is thus whether the principles underlying the Twenty-First
Amendment are sufficiently implicated by the exemption for
okolehao and pineapple wine to outweigh the Commerce Clause prin-
ciples that would otherwise be offended."15 3 The Court thus stated
145 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 270.
148 Id. (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15
(1981); City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977)).
149 Id. at 271.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 274-76.
152 Id. at 275.
153 Id. The Court's formulation is not altogether different from that used in Capi-
tal Cities, which was not materially different from that used in Midcal. See supra note
141. The reason that Bacchus, and not Capital Cities or Midcal, is the case most often
cited for this test is probably because Bacchus is a dormant Commerce Clause case,
and that has been the most common type of Twenty-First Amendment case in recent
years. Moreover, Bacchus added more substance to its core purposes test than did
either Capital Cities or Midcal.
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what has become known as the "core purposes" or "core concerns"
test.
The Court then performed the test. One difficulty the Court al-
luded to was that of determining what it was, exactly, that the Twenty-
First Amendment authorized. 154 The Court was able to move past this
difficulty, however: "Doubts about the scope of the Amendment's au-
thorization notwithstanding, one thing is certain: The central purpose
of the provision was not to empower States to favor local liquor indus-
tries by erecting barriers to competition." 155 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, state laws that amount to mere protectionism are not enti-
tled to the degree of deference given to laws aimed at fighting the
problems associated with unrestrained liquor trafficking. 156 Hawaii
did "not seek to justify its tax on the ground that it was designed to
promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the Twenty-
first Amendment."157 The tax fell "because the tax violate[d] a cen-
tral tenet of the Commerce Clause, but [was] not supported by any
clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment. ' 158 With this decision,
the core purposes test had come into full effect. 159 This is the test the
Supreme Court settled on as the way to accommodate two parts of the
154 See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 274-75; supra Part I.D.
155 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, dissented. Justice
Stevens noted that the tax was applied to liquor in the Hawaiian market that would
likely be consumed in Hawaii. Thus, he argued, the tax fits within the ambit of Sec-
tion 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment, which "expressly mentions 'delivery or use
therein.'" Id. at 280 (StevensJ., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Stevens characterized
the tax as a direct regulation on the sale or use of liquor, and claimed that, as such,
the tax was an exercise of the core powers conferred on the states by Section 2. Id. at
285 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,
713 (1984)). Further, Justice Stevens posited that Hawaii would surely be able to ban
the importation of all liquor. Justice Stevens also felt that it was clear that Hawaii
could do so without banning the sale of local liquors. Because the state would have
the power to create a local monopoly, it seemed sensible that the state should be
allowed to engage in a lesser form of discrimination by granting a tax exemption for
locally produced alcohol. Id. at 286 (StevensJ., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Ste-
vens relied on the early post-Prohibition cases for the point that the Twenty-First
Amendment gave the states broad authority to regulate commerce in intoxicating
liquors. Id. at 281-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the
Court's core concerns approach as "novel," stating that the question is not one of core
purposes, but of whether the law in question is an exercise of the power expressly
conferred on the states by the Twenty-First Amendment. To Justice Stevens and his
fellow dissenters, it plainly was. Id. at 286-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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same Constitution: the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce
Clause. 160
While the core purposes test has certainly become very impor-
tant, Bacchus's significance goes beyond the articulation of that test
alone. Bacchus also marked the first time that a state's ability to im-
pose liquor regulations was held to be limited by the dormant Com-
merce Clause. Moreover, until Bacchus, the Court had not limited the
ability of the states to set the terms upon which alcohol could be im-
ported from other states. 16' Bacchus thus opened the door for the
current wave of challenges to state direct-shipment laws.
Since Bacchus, the only truly new ground broken by the Supreme
Court has been its invalidation of state liquor price affirmation stat-
utes. For example, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Authority,162 the Court invalidated a New York law that required
out-of-state producers to charge New York wholesalers prices that were
no higher than the lowest price charged to wholesalers in any other
state. 1 63 The Court found that the statute was a direct regulation on
interstate commerce, impermissible under the Commerce Clause, be-
cause by requiring that New York wholesalers be charged the lowest
rate offered, it restricted producers' abilities to lower prices else-
where. Thus, the New York law effectively regulated the price at
which liquor could be sold in other states. 164 Such a regulation could
not be saved by the Twenty-First Amendment because it could inter-
fere with other states' abilities to exercise their own Twenty-First
Amendment authority.1 65 The Court reached virtually the same con-
clusion in a related price affirmation case, Healy v. Beer Institute.'66
The price affirmation cases do not have much of an implication
for direct-shipment laws. The controlling rationale in Brown-Forman
and Healy was that the state laws in question regulated liquor prices in
other states as well. 167 This is not a concern with direct-shipment laws.
It could also be argued that Brown-Forman and Healy did not even limit
state power. After all, the Court did note that part of the problem
with price affirmation statutes is that they interfere with other states'
abilities to wield Twenty-First Amendment power. 168 Thus, it is possi-
160 See Hostetter v. ldlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964).
161 Denning, supra note 116, at 328.
162 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
163 Id. at 575.
164 Id. at 582.
165 Id. at 585.
166 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989).
167 See Martin, supra note 3, at 19; Kozusko, supra note 7, at 95.
168 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 585.
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ble to frame the price-affirmation cases as promoting state power
under the Twenty-First Amendment as opposed to limiting it.
However one views the price affirmation cases, it is apparent that
Bacchus and its predecessors control the inquiry surrounding state di-
rect-shipment laws. This becomes obvious not only because Bacchus
was the first case to address the relationship between the Twenty-First
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause, but from study of
the multitude of circuit court of appeals cases that have examined
state direct-shipment laws.
III. RECENT CIRCUIT COURT CASES DEALING WITH
DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS
Since 2000, six federal circuit courts of appeals have heard cases
challenging state direct-shipment laws. Five of those cases have been
decided in the past year and a half. The sheer number of cases, cou-
pled with the existence of a split among the circuits, has led many
commentators to suggest that this issue is destined for the Supreme
Court. 169 These cases reveal just how prominent a constitutional con-
cern state direct-shipment laws are and may provide clues as to how
the Supreme Court could take steps to clarify its Twenty-First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.
A. The Mainstream: Applying Bacchus to Direct-Shipment Laws
Most of the recent circuit court of appeals decisions have applied
the framework set down by the Supreme Court in Bacchus to deter-
mine the constitutionality of direct-shipment laws. All of the circuit
courts of appeals using this approach have found the challenged di-
rect-shipment laws to be constitutionally invalid. Despite these appar-
ently consistent results, the courts' application of the Bacchus test has
not always been perfectly consistent. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
examine each of these cases individually.
1. The Eleventh Circuit: Bainbridge v. Turner
The first federal court of appeals to apply the Bacchus test to a
challenged alcohol direct-shipment law was the Eleventh Circuit in
Bainbridge v. Turner.170 Florida, like many states, has a three-tier distri-
169 See, e.g., Denning, supra note 116, at 329; Timothy Schnabel, Note, A Circuit-
Splitting Headache: The Hangover of the Supreme Court's Twenty-First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 547, 547 (2003).
170 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
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bution system,171 but Florida carved out an exception for in-state win-
eries, allowing them to obtain vendors' permits and ship directly to
consumers so long as the winery used vehicles that it owned or
leased. I7 2 Out-of-state wineries, contrariwise, were prohibited from
shipping directly to consumers.1 73 The court noted that this allowed
in-state wineries to avoid the three-tier distribution system and thus
the hassles and price mark-ups that come with it. Out-of-state winer-
ies, which could not avoid the three-tier system, were put at a competi-
tive disadvantage. 174
Just like the Supreme Court did in Bacchus, the Eleventh Circuit
used a two-step approach. The first step was to determine whether
Florida's statute violated the Commerce Clause. I 75 For this first step,
the court employed the typical dormant Commerce Clause analysis
that would be used to analyze a state law regulating any typical article
of commerce not covered by the Twenty-First Amendment. 176 Under
this analysis, a state law that discriminates against interstate commerce
in purpose or in effect is generally struck down without any further
inquiry, and can only be upheld if the regulation serves a legitimate
local purpose that cannot adequately be served by nondiscriminatory
alternatives. 177 If, on the other hand, the state law has only indirect
effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, courts ex-
amine whether the state interest is legitimate and conduct a balancing
test to determine whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly
exceeds the putative local benefits. 78 If a state liquor regulation can
survive this traditional inquiry, there would presumably be no reason
to conduct any further Twenty-First Amendment inquiry.
Based on the court's characterization of Florida's direct-shipment
law, it should be easy to surmise that the court concluded that Flor-
ida's direct-shipment law did not survive traditional dormant Com-
merce Clause scrutiny. Florida's regulatory regime failed tier one of
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis because it was facially discrim-
inatory against out-of-state wineries. 179 The court also agreed with the
171 Id. at 1106; see supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
172 Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1106-07.
173 Id. at 1107.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1108.
176 See id. at 1108-09.
177 Id. (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); Hunt
v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)).
178 Id. at 1109 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
179 Id.
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district court that there were reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives available to achieve the state's proffered interests in maintaining
revenue, avoiding diversion of liquor into its distribution system, and
preventing sales to minors. 80
Because the Florida regulatory regime did not survive dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny, the court moved to step two of its two-step
analysis and sought to determine whether the Twenty-First Amend-
ment saved Florida's direct-shipment law. The court started by ac-
knowledging that the amendment "permits states to enact some laws
banning the importation of alcoholic beverages even though such
laws might, without the Twenty-first Amendment, violate the dormant
Commerce Clause." 181 However, the court also recognized that "the
Amendment falls short of giving the states free rein in regulating the
importation of alcoholic beverages." 18 2
The court then opined that the best reading of the Supreme
Court cases is that the Commerce Clause remains in full force in all
cases unless a core concern of the Twenty-First Amendment is impli-
cated.183 Notably, not only does this contention arguably go far be-
yond anything the Supreme Court ever said, i8 4 it goes beyond
anything that the appellants argued.8 5 This dicta i8 6 is the most re-
strictive view of the Twenty-First Amendment ever stated by a federal
appellate court.
Next the court applied Bacchus. One of the important lessons of
Bacchus, the court found, was that "statutes closely intertwined with a
purpose 'closely related' to the Twenty-first Amendment can generally
withstand an otherwise fatal attack under the Commerce Clause."' 8 7
Another lesson that the court gleaned from Bacchus was that statutes
are not "closely related" if their primary purpose is merely to protect
180 Id. at 1109-10.
181 Id. at 1112.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See infra Part IV.B.1.
185 See Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112. The appellants "impliedly" argued that the
Twenty-First Amendment "only" eliminated the principle that a state statute that has
indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly is invalid if the
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the legitimate local benefits. Id. Ac-
cording to the court, however, even an evenhanded state liquor regulation could pos-
sibly be found invalid if it does not implicate a core concern of the Twenty-First
Amendment.
186 This part of the holding is dicta because the court had already found that the
Florida law was facially discriminatory. See id. at 1109.
187 Id. at 1113.
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local industry.188 Therefore, the court had to decide whether the
Florida statute was closely intertwined with a Twenty-First Amendment
purpose, or if it was intended instead merely to protect local industry.
In looking at the purpose of the statute, the court emphasized
the requirement that the state present evidence to support the need
for its discriminatory alcohol control laws. It is not enough for the
state to raise a core concern, but the state must show that its statutory
scheme is "genuinely needed to effectuate the proffered .core con-
cern."1 8 9 This sounds extremely similar to the typical dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis. A person reading this part of the opinion in
isolation might wonder whether the Twenty-First Amendment has any
effect on the Commerce Clause at all. Apparently sensitive to this crit-
icism, the court added in a footnote that "[t] he evidentiary standard is
far less than the strict scrutiny required under a traditional tier-one
analysis of discriminatory laws. For example, the State need not show
that there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives available."1 90 None-
theless, the court then subjected the Florida law to an examination
that looks very similar to strict scrutiny. The court put each of Flor-
ida's three proffered core concerns (preventing sale to minors, ensur-
ing orderly markets, and maintaining revenue) into the crucible, and
found two of them lacking. 19' For example, the court found that the
state could prevent sale to minors even if the discriminatory direct-
shipment statute were stricken down. All the state would have to do
would be to subject out-of-state wineries to the same laws as in-state
wineries (by allowing them to deliver directly to consumers in their
own vehicles or vehicles they lease), and revoke their beverage li-
censes if they illegally deliver to minors. 92 As for ensuring orderly
markets, the court professed not to know what that phrase means, but
decided that it surely does not include discrimination against out-of-
state firms. 19 3 Finally, the court remanded the case for further find-
ings on the revenue issue. The court said that it was not enough for
Florida to show that taxation is a core concern and that the three-tier
distribution system promotes its revenue raising goals. Before Florida
could use the Twenty-First Amendment as a test, the court said that "it
must show that its statutory scheme is necessary to effectuate the prof-
fered core concern in a way that justifies treating out-of-state firms
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1114.
190 Id. at 1114 n.17.
191 Id. at 1114-15.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1115.
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differently from in-state firms-a fact question.1 94 Thus, Florida's di-
rect-shipment law survived pending remand, but had suffered a near
fatal wound from the Eleventh Circuit.
While the Eleventh Circuit used what has become the standard
approach to direct-shipment laws and applied the Supreme Court's
Bacchus analysis, it did so in an unusually expansive and somewhat
inconsistent way. The court started by framing the issue in a suitably
narrow way, saying: "The primary question in this appeal is whether
the State of Florida may prohibit out-of-state wineries from shipping
their products directly to Florida consumers while permitting in-state
wineries to do sO. ''195 Deeper into the opinion, however, the court
went so far as to draw the validity of Florida's entire three-tier distribu-
tion system into doubt when it stated that Florida must prove that "the
three-tier distribution scheme, although discriminatory, promotes its reve-
nue raising goals." 196 The idea that a state's entire alcohol regulatory
system might be struck down surely goes beyond anything the Su-
preme Court has ever suggested. 197 Similarly, the court professed to
be true to the Supreme Court's Twenty-First Amendment precedents,
and Bacchus in particular, but still went on to say that even state liquor
statutes that regulate evenhandedly can be struck down under the
dormant Commerce Clause if those statutes do not implicate core
concerns.' 98 However, none of the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause/Twenty-First Amendment cases dealt with a statute that regu-
lated evenhandedly. All of them involved statutes that were either
facially discriminatory 99 or regulated extraterritorially. 200 It might be
proper for the Eleventh Circuit to extend the Supreme Court's prece-
dents in such a manner if it were necessary to decide a case. In Bain-
bridge, however, there was no such necessity. The court had already
determined that Florida's law was facially discriminatory. 20 1 It is thus
extremely unclear why the court engaged in its discussion regarding
evenhanded alcohol regulations.
A third problem with Bainbridge is that while it continually pro-
fesses that alcohol is different from any other article of commerce be-
cause of the Twenty-First Amendment, it does not really treat it as
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1106.
196 Id. at 1115 (emphasis added).
197 See infra Part IV.B.1.
198 See Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112.
199 See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984).
200 See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986).
201 See Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109.
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such. Even after saying that the Twenty-First Amendment allows state
justifications based on core concerns to escape strict scrutiny, the
court subjected Florida's proffered core concerns to what appears to
be strict scrutiny.20 2 For example, it is not clear what difference there
is, if any, between strict scrutiny and the court's requirement that Flor-
ida "show that its statutory scheme is necessary to effectuate the prof-
fered core concern .... -203 As these problems illustrate, in finding
that Florida's discriminatory direct-shipment law was constitutionally
questionable, the Bainbridge court went much further than it needed
to and much further than is warranted by Supreme Court precedent.
2. The Fourth Circuit: Beskind v. Easley
In Beskind v. Easley,204 the Fourth Circuit had its turn to hear a
challenge of a state direct-shipment law. The plaintiffs were a Califor-
nia winery and various individual oenophiles who claimed that North
Carolina's Alcoholic Beverage Control laws were unconstitutional
even in light of the Twenty-First Amendment. Specifically, the plain-
tiffs challenged the portions of North Carolina's laws that required
out-of-state wine to pass through its three-tiered distribution system,
but allowed local wineries to sell directly to consumers. These provi-
sions, according to the plaintiffs, violated the dormant Commerce
Clause by discriminating against out-of-state commerce in a way that
could not be justified under the Twenty-First Amendment. 20 5
The Fourth Circuit employed the now familiar two-prong ap-
proach of Bacchus, looking first at whether the state regulation vio-
lated the Commerce Clause without reference to the Twenty-First
Amendment.20 6 Since North Carolina's laws required out-of-state win-
eries to distribute their wines through the state's three-tiered system,
with its characteristic mark-ups in price, but allowed local wineries to
bypass the system by selling directly to consumers, the laws were found
to be facially discriminatory in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. 20 7 The court was also able to identify at least one reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternative, namely requiring in-state wines to pass
202 Id. at 1115 & n.17.
203 Id. at 1115 (emphasis added); see also Schnabel, supra note 169, at 553 (argu-
ing that the Bainbridge court actually sought proof that there were no reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives for Florida's law even after stating that no such proof was
required).
204 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
205 Id. at 509.
206 Id. at 513-14.
207 Id. at 515.
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through the three-tiered system as well. 208 Therefore, it was necessary
for the court to move to step two of the Bacchus inquiry.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of whether North Carolina's direct-
shipment laws were saved by the Twenty-First Amendment started by
correctly noting that the plaintiffs did not challenge North Carolina's
three-tiered system standing alone. 20 9 This was appropriate, accord-
ing to the court, because the three-tiered system "is a long-standing
regulatory scheme authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment."210
What the plaintiffs did challenge was whether modifying the three-
tiered system to convey special benefits to in-state wineries served a
recognizable Twenty-First Amendment purpose.211 North Carolina
failed to appraise the court of any Twenty-First Amendment interest
that was served by allowing in-state wineries to sell directly to consum-
ers while prohibiting out-of-state wineries from doing the same
thing.2 12 Indeed, "North Carolina's authorization of in-state direct-
shipment of wine-which has the effect of increasing access to wine
produced only in North Carolina-cannot credibly be portrayed as
anything other than local economic boosterism in the guise of a law
aimed at alcoholic beverage control."213 Based on the foregoing, the
court concluded that the Twenty-First Amendment did not save North
Carolina's discriminatory direct-shipment law.
The Fourth Circuit's Twenty-First Amendment analysis in Beskind
stands in marked contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Bain-
bridge. The Fourth Circuit limits itself to the precise challenge before
the court, i.e., whether the aspects of North Carolina's liquor regula-
tions that discriminate against out-of-state wineries are valid. The
Fourth Circuit does not presume to question whether North Caro-
lina's entire three-tiered distribution system is valid, or to pronounce
what the law would be if North Carolina's statute were not facially
discriminatory. In fact, the Fourth Circuit reaffirms North Carolina's
right to set up a three-tiered system, a position much more in line with
the Supreme Court precedents than the Eleventh Circuit's dicta in
Bainbridge.214 If anything, the Fourth Circuit calls upon North Caro-
lina to strengthen its regulatory system, admonishing the state that
"the authorization for direct in-state sales of wine by in-state wineries
reduces the number of licensed entities regulating the distribution of
208 Id.
209 Id. at 516.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 517.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See infra Part IV.B.2.
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wine and therefore has the tendency of surrendering control other-
wise authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment. '215 The Fourth Cir-
cuit's position, then, is generally friendly toward state alcohol
regulatory systems, so long as the state does not baldly discriminate
against out-of-state concerns.
Consistent with this position is the court's choice of remedy.
Rather than strike down all of North Carolina's direct-shipment laws,
the court simply struck the law that exempted in-state wineries. 216
This was appropriate, the court determined, because North Carolina
retained the right to regulate its alcohol distribution system under the
Twenty-First Amendment, and continued to maintain an interest in
doing so. 217 Therefore, the best way for the court to give effect to
state policy while still doing what is necessary to enforce the U.S. Con-
stitution would be to strike only the local preference provision and
leave the rest of North Carolina's three-tiered regulatory regime in
place.218 The court was able to remedy the constitutional violation
while still respecting North Carolina's right to regulate its alcohol dis-
tribution system under the Twenty-First Amendment.
3. The Fifth Circuit: Dickerson v. Bailey
The Fifth Circuit had its chance to decide a direct-shipment law
case in Dickerson v. Bailey.219 The plaintiffs were Houston area wine
lovers who were frustrated by Texas laws that prevented them from
purchasing from a small Arkansas vintner.220 Texas prohibited out-of-
state wineries from shipping directly to consumers, but allowed in-
state vintners to do so. The plaintiffs claimed that Texas's prohibition
against direct shipment by out-of-state wineries burdened interstate
commerce and prevented Texans from engaging in their "fundamen-
tal liberty of interstate commerce." 221
215 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 517.
216 Id. at 519.
217 Id.
218 Id. This choice of remedy, naturally, disappointed the plaintiffs. The lead
plaintiff, Donald H. Beskind, a Duke University law professor and wine collector, was
quoted as saying that the court's remedy "wasn't at all what we were looking for." See
Molly McDonough, They Will Sell No Wine Before It's Marked Up, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Apr.
18, 2003. Anticipating this objection, the Beskind court countered that the plaintiffs'
"right is not to void a law protected by the Twenty-first Amendment but rather to
eliminate discrimination in interstate commerce." Beskind, 325 F.3d at 520.
219 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
220 Id. at 392.
221 Id. at 393.
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Predictably, the court applied the two-step Bacchus approach,
starting with the preliminary inquiry into whether the challenged
Texas statutes violated the dormant Commerce Clause.222 To start
this inquiry, the court discussed the Texas regulatory regime in some
detail. Texas, like Florida and North Carolina, has a three-tier alcohol
distribution system. The statutes at issue contained some of the only
exceptions to the three-tier system, allowing in-state wineries, and only
in-state wineries, to bypass the system by selling directly to consum-
ers. 223 More specifically, Texas wineries could sell directly to consum-
ers (in person) up to 25,000 gallons of wine per year, with no per
customer restrictions. In addition to that, Texas wineries were al-
lowed to ship up to 25,000 gallons per year directly to consumers,
again with no per customer limit. By contrast, Texas residents were
prohibited from carrying more than three gallons of wine from an
out-of-state vintner into the state of Texas. Out-of-state wineries were
prohibited from shipping any wine at all directly to customers in
Texas. 224 These facts alone would have made it easy enough for the
court to find that the Texas law was facially discriminatory and in-
tended for protectionist purposes. 225 This finding was made even eas-
ier for the court by the fact that numerous items from the legislative
history indicated that the purpose of the special exemptions for in-
state wineries was "[t]o promote the sale and consumption of Texas
wine over those wines produced in other states."226 All of this evi-
dence confirmed the fact that the statute was facially discriminatory.
The court followed this finding by chastising the administrator of
the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission for disingenuous trial strat-
egy. Here, the court conveyed a view of the states' Twenty-First
Amendment regulatory authority that is very similar to the view the
Fourth Circuit panel expressed in Beskind. In the Fifth Circuit panel's
view, the administrator attempted to distract the court by mis-
characterizing the scope of the plaintiffs' challenge. 227 The adminis-
trator claimed that the plaintiffs were challenging the legitimacy of
Texas's three-tier system in an attempt to establish an unregulated na-
tional market in wine. This, according to the court, was untrue; all
the plaintiffs sought was equal treatment for out-of-state vintners. 228
The administrator also claimed that Texas required every drop of li-
222 Id. at 396.
223 See id. at 397.
224 Id. at 397-98.
225 Id. at 398-99.
226 Id. at 399.
227 See id. at 400-01.
228 Id.
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quor sold in the state to pass through its three-tier system. The court
pointed out that this assertion was patently false. 229 If, however, Texas
did apply its chosen regulatory regime equally to both in-state and
out-of-state wineries, it would be perfectly valid. 230 Thus, like the
Beskind court, the Fifth Circuit panel recognized the power of the
states to set up a three-tier liquor distribution system.
The court ended its dormant Commerce Clause analysis by seek-
ing to determine whether the facially discriminatory Texas regulations
were necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest that could not
be served by reasonable alternative means. While the administrator
made conclusory assertions that the challenged provisions regulated
alcohol consumption in Texas, he made no effort to show that there
were no nondiscriminatory means available. 231 Even if he had, he
would almost certainly have been unable to offer a state interest sub-
stantial enough to justify preventing the equal competition of out-of-
state liquor businesses under traditional dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. 232 Therefore, it was necessary for the court to move to phase
two of the Bacchus analysis and determine whether the Texas regula-
tions could be saved by the Twenty-First Amendment.
Step two of the court's Bacchus inquiry was dominated by an at-
tempt to correct the administrator's apparent misunderstanding of
the core concerns test. The administrator apparently believed that a
state statute survives the core concerns test as long as it controls the
importation of alcohol and meets a minimal threshold of rationality. 233
The court rejected the administrator's proposition and said that the
second level of the Supreme Court's Bacchus test requires courts to
"scrutinize strictly whether a state's statutes are tailored to the Twenty-
First Amendment's 'core concerns.' '" 234 Whereas the administrator
offered no evidence linking Texas's challenged regulations to a core
concern, the plaintiffs managed "to establish the discriminatory intent
and effect of the challenged statutes, the availability of alternative
means to enforce Texas's core concerns under the Twenty-First
Amendment, and the absence of any safe-harbor for the challenged
statutes under § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment. ' 235 Texas's prefer-
ential direct-shipment laws were struck down.
229 Id. at 401.
230 Id. (citing Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000)).
231 Id. at 401-02.
232 Id. at 402.
233 Id. at 404.
234 Id. at 406.
235 Id.
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The Fifth Circuit panel's Bacchus analysis is a mix of deference to
state direct-shipment laws and strict scrutiny of those same regula-
tions, but with the emphasis on the deference. On the deference side,
the court limited itself to deciding whether the discriminatory aspects
of Texas's system are valid, much like the Beskind court did.2 36 Moreo-
ver, the Dickerson court agreed with the Beskind court that states are
free to structure their own alcoholic beverage regulatory regime as
long as the states do not blatantly discriminate against out-of-state pro-
ducers.23 7 Interestingly, the Dickerson court reached this conclusion at
both levels of its Bacchus inquiry, making it unclear whether the court
based its conclusion on a finding that nondiscriminatory direct-ship-
ment laws do not violate the Commerce Clause, or on a finding that
the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes nondiscriminatory direct-
shipment regulations. At one point, the court indicated that as long
as a state with a three-tier system subjects both domestic and out-of-
state liquor producers to the rigors of that system, it would not even
violate the dormant Commerce Clause level of the Bacchus test.238
Later, the court adopted the view that Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment authorizes states to subject imported liquor to whatever
regulations they apply to local liquor, but no more.239 Presumably, if
Texas had applied its three-tier system, including its direct-shipment
laws to in-state wineries, its laws would not violate the dormant Com-
merce Clause and those already valid laws would be saved by the
Twenty-First Amendment. The Beskind court, by contrast, onlv found
that equitably applied three-tier systems are authorized by the Twenty-
First Amendment.240
236 See id. at 401.
237 See id. at 406 ("[Section] 2 enables a state to do to importation of liquor-
including direct deliveries to consumers in original packages-what it chooses to do
to internal sales of liquor, but nothing more.") (quoting Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-
Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000)).
238 See id. at 401 (indicating that the Seventh Circuit "rightly held that there was
no Commerce Clause violation" in regulatory schemes where there is "no disparity in
regulatory compliance" between local and out-of-state producers).
239 See id. at 406.
240 Despite its fairly broad view of state power under the Twenty-First Amendment,
the Dickerson court specifically chose not to apply the same remedy as the Beskind
court. Instead, the Dickerson court chose to strike down the direct-shipment prohibi-
tion for out-of-state wineries. However, this is not because the Dickerson court ques-
tioned Texas's authority to impose nondiscriminatory direct-shipment bans. See id. at
408 ("If the Texas legislature wishes to impose burdens [on in-state and out-of-state
commerce] equally-as opposed to granting benefits equally-then that is its prerog-
ative ... ."). Rather, the different choices of remedy had to do with the two courts'
differing views about what remedies were appropriate in light of the respective plain-
tiffs' complaints. Compare Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003)
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In a one aspect, however, the Dickerson decision is more reminis-
cent of Bainbridge than Beskind. Late in the decision, the Dickerson
court said that Bacchus "requires us to scrutinize strictly whether a
state's statutes are tailored to the Twenty-First Amendment's 'core
concerns. "' 241 It could be argued that with this statement, Dickerson
goes even further than Bainbridge did, as the Bainbridge court at least
claimed not to be applying strict scrutiny.242 For this reason, the Dick-
erson court could be subjected to the same criticism as the Bainbridge
court: by applying strict scrutiny during step two of Bacchus, the court
would rob the Twenty-First Amendment of any meaning at all. 243
However, Dickerson is not nearly as problematic as Bainbridge in actual
practice. This is because the Dickerson court apparently would not sub-
ject state alcohol laws that regulate evenhandedly, with only incidental
effects on commerce, to strict scrutiny, while the Bainbridge court indi-
cated that it would.244 The Dickerson court, on the other hand, would
uphold any state distribution scheme (including direct-shipment laws)
that regulates out-of-state firms on the same terms as in-state firms. 245
Dickerson is deferential towards the states' right to shape their own al-
coholic beverage distribution systems, including direct-shipment laws,
as long as the states subject in-state firms to the same regulations as
out-of-state firms.
4. The Sixth Circuit: Heald v. Engler
The Sixth Circuit heard yet another challenge to a state's direct-
shipment laws in Heald v. Engler.246 The plaintiffs were wine fanciers,
wine journalists, and a small California winery that shipped its wine to
out-of-state customers. 247 Michigan has a three-tier system, although it
("[T]he plaintiffs' . . . right is not to void a law protected by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment but rather to eliminate discrimination in interstate commerce."), with Dickerson,
336 F.3d at 407 ("Here, Plaintiffs sued to obtain equal benefits under the [Texas Alco-
holic Beverages Code], i.e., direct sales and shipments of wine to Texas consumers.
This goal-the extension of benefits, not the extension of burdens-is inherent in a
claim under the Commerce Clause."). In addition, the Dickerson court found that it
would be more "surgical" to strike down the ban on direct shipments from out-of-
state, since requiring Texas wineries to use the three-tier system would require "the
wholesale revision of substantial portions" of Texas's alcoholic beverages laws. Id. at
408.
241 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 406 (emphasis added).
242 See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1114 n.17 (lth Cir. 2002).
243 See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
244 See Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112.
245 See Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 401, 406.
246 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003).
247 Id. at 519.
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discriminated against out-of-state wineries in favor of in-state wineries
by allowing in-state wineries, but not out-of-state wineries, to ship their
products directly to Michigan consumers, resulting in a competitive
advantage for Michigan wineries. 248
After giving a brief history of the Supreme Court's post-Prohibi-
tion jurisprudence, 249 the court applied the core concerns test. Fol-
lowing a review of Bacchus and the cases that led up to it, the court
said that a state must prove more than just that its challenged alcohol
laws were motivated by core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment.
Instead, "[u] nder a Commerce Clause analysis, facially discriminatory
laws are still subject to strict scrutiny, meaning that the state must
demonstrate that no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives are
available to advance the same legitimate goals. '250 The court thereby
revealed that under its view, the core purposes prong of the Bacchus
test requires strict scrutiny. However, it is unclear whether the court
meant to apply this rule only to facially discriminatory laws, or to even-
handed regulations that incidentally affect commerce as well. Per-
haps the court gave some hint when it said it "reject [s] the implication
that a state's 'virtually complete control' over liquor regulation en-
ables it to discriminate against out-of-state interests in favor of in-state
interests. '2 51 Arguably, this could be interpreted to mean that states
are only constrained in crafting their liquor regulation systems by the
requirement that they not discriminate against out-of-state interests.
Under this interpretation, a state would be able to promulgate nondis-
criminatory direct-shipment limitations. Supporting this interpreta-
tion is the court's next paragraph:
Given this background, we cannot endorse the district court's char-
acterization of the regulation in this case as a constitutionally be-
nign product of the state's three-tier system and, thus, "a proper
exercise of [Michigan's Twenty-first Amendment] authority, despite
the fact that such a system places a minor burden in interstate
commerce."
252
This statement could be read as implying that products of the three-
tier system are "constitutionally benign," but that Michigan's direct-
shipment laws were not a product of the three-tier system because of
their discriminatory application.
248 Id. at 520-21.
249 Id. at 522-23.
250 Id. at 524.
251 Id.
252 Id. (quoting the district court).
UNMIXING A JURISPRUDENTIAL COCKTAIL
Cutting against this reading, though, is the court's statement that
the proper approach is to apply traditional dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, and if the provisions are found to be unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause "to determine whether the state has
shown that it has no reasonable nondiscriminatory means of advanc-
ing the 'core concerns' of the Twenty-first Amendment. '253 This
would apparently include the prong of the traditional dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis that applies to statutes that regulate evenhand-
edly with incidental effects on interstate commerce, which are
subjected to a balancing test.254 If a state alcohol regulation failed
that balancing test, it would seemingly be subjected to strict scrutiny
to determine whether the state can show that it has no nondiscrimina-
tory means of advancing its Twenty-First Amendment core concerns.
In any event, the court had no occasion to confirm either read-
ing, because the court found it unmistakable that Michigan's direct-
shipment provision was facially discriminatory. 255 The court then pro-
ceeded to apply its strict scrutiny version of the core purposes test.
Based on an examination of the record, the court said that it was una-
ble to find that Michigan's direct-shipment provision served any core
Twenty-First Amendment concern, "much less that no reasonable
nondiscriminatory means exists to satisfy these concerns."256 As a re-
sult, Michigan's discriminatory direct-shipment law fell.
The most troubling aspect of the Sixth Circuit panel's Heald deci-
sion is that it is unclear whether it casts evenhanded three-tier systems
into doubt, or only those that facially discriminate against out-of-state
concerns. As mentioned above, there is language that indicates that
the Heald court would consider striking down evenhanded regulations
that fail the dormant Commerce Clause balancing test and the Heald
strict-scrutiny version of the core concerns test. Moreover, the court
uses broad language to say that states cannot discriminate against
"out-of-state interests"25 7 instead of the narrower "out-of-state wineries"
or "out-of-state producers." This, coupled with the court's possible
willingness to consider striking down evenhanded alcohol regulations,
can reasonably be seen as supporting the views of some commentators
who argue that all direct-shipment laws should be struck down, even
253 Id.
254 Id. at 524-25; see supra text accompanying note 178.
255 See Heald, 342 F.3d at 525.
256 Id. at 526.
257 Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
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those that apply equally to in-state producers. 258 In as far as this is the
case, the Heald court can be criticized for overreaching.
259
There is also countervailing evidence indicating that the Heald
court did not overreach. Some of that evidence is contained in the
language discussed above supporting an interpretation of Heald that
only rejects facially discriminatory direct-shipment laws. 260 In addi-
tion, the court noted that "[i] t is important to keep in mind that the
relevant inquiry is not whether Michigan's three-tier system as a whole
promotes [core concerns] ... but whether the discriminatory scheme
challenged in this case-the direct-shipment ban for out-of-state win-
eries-does so."261 The court thus narrowed its holding. It is worth
noting that the court cited Beskind for this point, perhaps indicating
that the Sixth Circuit would support nondiscriminatory direct-ship-
ment laws like the Fourth Circuit did in Beskind.262 Furthermore, the
court narrowed its "out-of-state interests" language when it said:
The district court in this case was correct in finding that the Michi-
gan alcohol distribution system discriminates between in-state and
out-of-state interests to the extent that in state wineries may obtain
licenses to ship wine directly to consumers, but out-of-state wineries
may not and are instead required to go through the more costly
three-tier system. 263
The inclusion of the phrase "to the extent that" seems to reveal that
the court only meant to address its decision to discrimination in the
form of preferences for in-state wineries over out-of-state wineries.
Therefore, the proper reading of the Heald decision is probably that it
frowns upon only the type of facially discriminatory direct-shipment
law that was in place in Michigan.
B. The Outliers: Rejecting the Bacchus Approach
While each of the four preceding circuit court of appeals deci-
sions were different in several ways, they all used the same basic analyt-
ical framework: the dual-level Bacchus core purposes approach. Two
circuit courts of appeals, the Seventh and Second Circuits, have re-
jected the Bacchus approach; both of those circuits upheld the chal-
lenged direct-shipment laws. While the Seventh and Second Circuits
reached different conclusions about the direct-shipment laws they ad-
258 See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 6; Molnar, supra note 7.
259 See infra Part IV.C.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 251-52.
261 Heald, 342 F.3d at 526.
262 See id.
263 Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
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dressed than the other circuits, their conclusions are not necessarily
incompatible with the conclusions reached by the other circuits.
1. The Seventh Circuit: Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson
The first circuit court of appeals to reject the two-prong Bacchus
framework was the Seventh Circuit.26 4 It did so in Bridenbaugh v. Free-
man-Wilson,2 65 which was also the first direct-shipment law challenge
to be decided by a federal appellate court. In a controversial deci-
sion, 2 6 6 the Seventh Circuit found that Indiana's direct-shipment law
was a valid exercise of the state's Twenty-First Amendment authority
and sustained it against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
The plaintiffs in the case were Indiana oenophiles. 267 Indiana,
predictably, has a three-tier alcohol distribution system with different
permits for manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. Local wineries
are allowed to obtain a permit to ship directly to Indiana consumers,
but the same is not true of wineries "in the business of selling ... in
another state or country."268 The parties devoted their cases to argu-
ing over whether the challenged statute furthered any of the core con-
cerns of the Twenty-First Amendment. In the eyes of the court,
however, this was a waste of time. The court wanted it to be clear that
when deciding whether state laws are authorized by the Twenty-First
Amendment, "our guide is the text and history of the Constitution,
not the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or may not have animated
its drafters." 269 Text and history would inform the court's interpreta-
264 The Bridenbaugh decision was written by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook. A fasci-
nating historical footnote to the case is the fact that the position of the Bacchus appel-
lant, Bacchus Imports, Ltd., was argued by an eminent lawyer named Frank H.
Easterbrook. See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 264 (1984).
265 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
266 Compare Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 526-27 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that
Bridenbaugh had been criticized by many federal courts); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311
F.3d 1104, 1114 n.15 (lth Cir. 2002) (indicating disagreement with the analytical
framework used in Bridenbaugh); Martin, supra note 65, at 68-71 (characterizing the
reasoning behind the decision as being "patently silly"), with Denning, supra note
116, at 332-33 (calling the decision a "welcome corrective" to district court opinions
that gave broad readings to the Supreme Court's Twenty-First Amendment cases);
Gordon Eng, Old Whine in a New Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to Balancing the Twenty-
First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Direct Shipping of Wine, 30 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1849, 1902-14 (2003) (characterizing the Bridenbaugh approach as the
most sensible baseline for reconciling the Twenty-First Amendment with the dormant
Commerce Clause)
267 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849.
268 Id. at 851 (quoting IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2000)).
269 Id.
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tion of the amendment; "suppositions about [the drafters'] mental
processes are unilluminating."270
After thus revealing its interpretive baseline, the court reviewed
the pre-Prohibition history of state direct-shipment regulations. The
court took special notice of the fact that the Supreme Court's Com-
merce Clause decisions consistently thwarted the dry states' efforts to
control alcohol by allowing out-of-state sources to bypass state regula-
tions by shipping directly to consumers. As a result, the court found,
in-state commerce suffered discrimination because out-of-state com-
merce could escape state regulations. According to the court, this en-
ded with the Webb-Kenyon Act, in which Congress gave teeth to state
alcohol-shipment prohibitions by using the federal commerce power
to ban the violation of such state laws.27 I Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment, the court noted, "tracks the Webb-Kenyon Act and effec-
tively incorporates its approach into the Constitution.'" 272 In effect, it
closed "the loophole" the dormant Commerce Clause created, namely
direct shipments to consumers from out-of-state sources that bypass
state regulatory systems.273 Indeed, Section 2 "speaks directly" to in-
terstate shipments because it addresses state "importation" laws.27 4
The court then turned to the Supreme Court's Twenty-First
Amendment jurisprudence, asserting that:
No decision of the Supreme Court holds or implies that laws limited
to the importation of liquor are problematic under the dormant
commerce clause. What the Court has held, however, is that the
greater power to forbid imports does not imply a lesser power to
allow imports on discriminatory terms.
2 75
The Bridenbaugh court characterized the Supreme Court cases as ap-
plying an unconstitutional-conditions approach to state alcohol regu-
lations, treating Section 2 as ending discrimination against in-state
commerce, but not as authorizing discrimination against out-of-state
commerce. In sum, Section 2 allows the state to regulate importation
of liquor to the same extent as it regulates internal liquor sales, but no
more.276
270 Id.
271 See id. at 851-52; see also supra Part I.A-C.
272 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
273 Id. In the court's view, the challenged Indiana statute was a clear example of
such a law aimed at preventing circumvention of the state regulatory system. The law
"channels ... sales through Indiana permit-holders, enabling Indiana to collect its
excise tax equally from in-state and out-of-state sellers." Id. at 854.
274 Id. at 853.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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Following its interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment and
the Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court turned to the Indiana
direct-shipment law. According to the court's reading of Indiana's
law, "Indiana insists that every drop of liquor pass through its three-
tiered system and be subjected to taxation."277 Therefore, Indiana's
law does not discriminate. While the plaintiffs argued that holders of
Indiana wholesale or retail permits could ship directly to Indiana con-
sumers, the court observed that those same permit holders could di-
rectly ship any wine, whether it was produced in Indiana or
elsewhere. 278 The court noted that there are anomolies. For exam-
ple, an Indiana retail permit holder that is also "in the business of
selling alcoholic beverages" in another state is permitted to ship di-
rectly to Indiana consumers by one statutory provision, but is prohib-
ited from doing so by another provision.279 The court left the task of
clearing up that discrepancy to Indiana's judiciary. 280 In the end, the
Bridenbaugh decision turned on the Seventh Circuit's construction of
Indiana's direct-shipment law. Because Indiana's statute was nondis-
criminatory in the eyes of the court, it was upheld.
One commentator has criticized the Bridenbaugh finding that all
alcohol must pass through Indiana's three-tier system as being "pa-
tently silly." 281 According to the commentator, the court ignored the
fact that Indiana wineries are allowed to obtain retail permits and ship
directly to consumers, whereas out-of-state vintners are prohibited
from doing so, which amounts to clear economic discrimination. 282
However, the court seems to account for this in its decision. The
court noted that the "[p]laintiffs do not complain about the statute
that apparently limits distribution permits to Indiana's citizens. These
plaintiffs are concerned only with direct shipments from out-of-state
sellers who lack and do not want Indiana permits."283 This implies that
the court's decision might be different if it was faced with a challenge
by an out-of-state winery that was denied an Indiana distribution
permit.
Obviously, the Seventh Circuit's approach to direct-shipment
cases differs from most of the other circuit courts of appeals that have
faced the same issue. Notably, the Seventh Circuit upheld the direct-
shipment law it was confronted with, while each of the four circuits
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 254 (quoting IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2000)).
280 Id.
281 Martin, supra note 65, at 70.
282 See id.
283 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854.
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discussed above rejected direct-shipment laws. In one way, however,
the Seventh Circuit's reading of the Twenty-First Amendment is actu-
ally narrower than that of the four circuits that applied Bacchus to
strike down direct-shipment laws. 284 The Seventh Circuit interprets
the Twenty-First Amendment and the Supreme Court jurisprudence
as implementing a nondiscrimination principle. 28 5 Thus, it would
strike down any facially discriminatory liquor regulation. The same
facially discriminatory liquor regulation would have a chance of surviv-
ing in the other circuits if the state could show that the regulation
implicates core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment.
On a more basic level, the Seventh Circuit used a completely dif-
ferent analytical framework in addressing the amendment. The Sev-
enth Circuit's view, based on the history and text of the amendment,
is that the Twenty-First Amendment is "a positive grant of power to the
states, enabling them to forbid the importation of alcohol or regulate
it to the same extent as they regulate its domestic sources."28 6 The
other circuits, on the other hand, eschew the history and text of the
Twenty-First Amendment and instead follow the Supreme Court's
Bacchus test, which they see as binding precedent that must be applied
any time a state alcohol regulation is challenged under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause is at the center of this analysis. The
reviewing court must first determine whether the state alcohol regula-
tion violates the Commerce Clause; if it does, the state may then use
the Twenty-First Amendment as a defense by showing that the chal-
lenged regulation implicates a core concern of the Twenty-First
Amendment. The difference between the Seventh Circuit's analytical
approach and that of the Eleventh, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits at
its core is affirmative grant of power versus affirmative defense. 2 7
The Seventh Circuit's analytical framework is highly suspect. The
Bridenbaugh court completely ignores the fact that the Bacchus test is
the method that the Supreme Court chose to accommodate the
Twenty-First Amendment with the Commerce Clause. Nothing in
Bacchus indicates that the Supreme Court did not intend for the test it
promulgated to apply in cases where the state law is "limited to the
importation of liquor."288 All indications are that it is to apply to all
Commerce Clause/Twenty-First Amendment cases. It is difficult to
read Bacchus as simply applying an unconstitutional-conditions ap-
284 See Schnabel, supra note 169, at 554.
285 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
286 Schnabel, supra note 169, at 554.
287 See id.
288 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
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proach to the states' use of Section 2 power, as the Seventh Circuit
professes to do. 289 If that was truly the Supreme Court's view, then it
wasted a lot of ink writing about core purposes.
2. The Second Circuit: Swedenburg v. Kelly
The most recent circuit court of appeals to hear a direct-ship-
ment law challenge was the Second Circuit in Swedenburg v. Kelly.290
Eschewing the Bacchus inquiry, the Second Circuit upheld New York's
challenged direct-shipment ban, finding that the challenged laws were
"within the ambit of the Twenty-first Amendment."291 While the case
is too recent to have attracted the same amount of criticism as
Bridenbaugh, the Second Circuit's characterization of the Twenty-First
Amendment is every bit as divergent as the Seventh Circuit's, and will
likely prove to be just as controversial.
The plaintiffs in Swedenburgwere a consortium of out-of-state win-
ery owners and in-state wine consumers. 29 2 New York has a three-
tiered system for alcohol sales and distribution. As part of that system,
no person is allowed to "sell at wholesale or retail any alcoholic bever-
age within the state without obtaining the appropriate license there-
fore required by this chapter."293 Other provisions require that any
alcohol shipped into the state be consigned to a person licensed
under New York's liquor control laws. 294 New York allows wineries to
obtain a state winery license, and in order to do so, a winery must pay
a licensing fee. 295 The winery must also maintain a branch factory,
office, or storeroom within the state and receive wine consigned to a
U.S. government bonded winery, warehouse, or storeroom within
New York. 29 6 One important privilege enjoyed by licensed wineries is
their ability to obtain retail licenses, which allow wineries to sell and
ship directly to their customers. 297 Out-of-state wineries are eligible
for New York licenses as long as they meet all of the state's require-
289 See id.
290 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
291 Id. at 227. The court also upheld New York's direct-shipment law against a
challenge under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Id. That aspect
of the decision is beyond the scope of this Note.
292 Id. at 229.
293 Id. at 228 (quoting N.Y. ALco. BEV. CoNT. LAw § 100(1) (McKinney 2000)).
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 229.
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ments, including the maintenance of a warehouse or other physical
presence in the state. 298
The Second Circuit considered the modes of analysis that the
other circuit courts of appeals applied to direct-shipment law cases.
Each of the other circuit courts of appeals, according to the Second
Circuit, took one of two approaches to direct-shipment law cases. 299
The first approach is the two-step inquiry3 ° ° employed in Bainbridge,
Beskind, Dickerson, and Heald, where the courts first subject challenged
statutes to traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Then, if
the statutes are found to violate the dormant Commerce Clause at
step one, the courts apply the core purposes test to see if the statutes
are "saved" by the Twenty-First Amendment.301 According to the Sec-
ond Circuit, "this two-step approach is flawed because it has the effect
of unnecessarily limiting the authority delegated to the states through
the clear and unambiguous language of section 2."302
Far preferable to the court was the second mode of analysis used
in direct-shipment law cases, which the court said is characterized by
Bridenbaugh.30 3 This approach considers the Twenty-First Amend-
ment's affirmative grant of authority to the states, and simply seeks to
determine whether the challenged statute falls within that authority.
If it does, the statute is exempted from the dormant Commerce
Clause.304 To the court, this inquiry allows for a true reconciling of
the Twenty-First Amendment with the Commerce Clause, and does
"not allow the protective doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause
to subordinate the plain language of the Twenty-first Amendment. '305
After thus choosing its analytical framework, the court analyzed
the legal history behind the Twenty-First Amendment. Like the Sev-
enth Circuit did in Bridenbaugh, the Second Circuit noted that early
state efforts to restrict the production and consumption of alcohol
were frustrated by the Supreme Court's invocation of the dormant
Commerce Clause to strike down state liquor regulations.30 6 The Wil-
son and Webb-Kenyon Acts were efforts to help the states make effec-
tive their alcoholic beverage control laws by keeping imported liquor
298 Id.
299 Id. at 230-31.
300 See supra Part III.A.
301 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 230-31
302 Id. at 231.
303 See id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 See id. at 231-32.
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out of dry-state markets. 30 7 After Prohibition, the states wanted to en-
sure that they would be able to control alcohol abuse, and enacted
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment for that purpose.308 Ac-
cording to the court, Section 2 constitutionalized most state laws regu-
lating importation, transportation, and distribution of alcoholic
beverages.30 9 Because Section 2 speaks directly to importation of li-
quor into the states, "[a] llowing dormant Commerce Clause concerns
to restrict state regulatory schemes that focus on the importation of
liquor would render section 2 a nullity. 3 10
Influenced by this summation of the Twenty-First Amendment's
historical basis, the court next analyzed the Supreme Court's Twenty-
First Amendment cases. The Second Circuit acknowledged "that
more recent cases have recognized that the Twenty-first Amendment
is not a plenary grant of authority to states to regulate all activity in-
volving alcohol." 31' However, any limits the Supreme Court placed on
the scope of Section 2 only apply insofar as the state attempts to regu-
late the alcohol trade outside of the state or in violation of federal
powers other than the commerce power. 312 Never, according to the
Swedenburg court, has the Supreme Court found that a state law lim-
ited to the importation or distribution of alcohol within the state's
borders is problematic under the dormant Commerce Clause. In-
deed, those are the very types of laws that Section 2 is intended to
protect.3 1
3
The court then applied these principles to the challenged New
York statutes. The Second Circuit found that the New York direct-
shipment law falls within the protection of Section 2 because it applies
only to the importation and distribution of alcohol within New
York.3 14 The law allows the state to regulate the distribution of alco-
hol by ensuring that all alcohol is sold through state-licensed entities.
Additionally, the court found no evidence that New York's direct-ship-
ment law was enacted for the purposes of mere economic protection-
ism.3 15 All wineries, whether in-state or out-of-state, are allowed to
307 See id. at 232.
308 See id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 233.
311 Id. at 234.
312 Id. at 236.
313 Id. at 236-37.
314 Id. at 237.
315 Id. The court made sure to include and to justify this finding because, in its
review of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the Second Circuit had characterized
Bacchus as standing for the simple principle that a state cannot invoke Section 2 as a
pretext for protectionism. Id. at 236.
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obtain a New York license as long as they meet all of the requirements,
including physical presence. 316
The court recognized that a physical presence requirement
would be problematic if applied to sales of most consumer goods.
The Supreme Court has found that state statutes requiring business
operations to be performed within the home state, which could be
performed more efficiendy elsewhere, are virtually always invalid. 317
However, the Second Circuit found that valid regulatory concerns
override any potential problems in the area of alcohol regulation.318
Physical presence allows New York to ensure that all who sell alcoholic
beverages within the state will be accountable to state authority.319
Records of sales and compliance must be kept by all licensees, and are
subject to inspection by New York officials. Physical presence, pre-
sumably, facilitates the inspection process. Also, if all wine is required
to pass through a government bonded warehouse in New York, state
officials will be sure to have access to the product. 320 New York chose
to create an exception to its three-tiered system for licensed wineries,
but "it has correlated its relaxation of regulatory scrutiny with a safety
net ensuring accountability-presence."3 21 The Swedenburg court in-
dicated that the fact that some out-of-state wineries might face greater
costs in accessing the New York market than other wineries was "not
determinative." Unlike Florida, North Carolina, Texas, or Michigan,
New York at least gives out-of-state wineries an opportunity to compete
on the same terms as in-state wineries.3 22 Because the New York di-
rect-shipment law directly relates to importation and distribution, and
because it is nondiscriminatory and nonprotectionist, the law was
upheld.
Like the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Bridenbaugh, the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis in Swedenburg is suspect in that it does not apply the
Bacchus test. As will be discussed below, it is entirely possible to find
There is a compelling argument to be made that parts of New York's licensing
regime are facially discriminatory and enacted for purely protectionist purposes.
Small New York wineries are able to obtain a "farm winery" license at a lower cost.
N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 76-a (McKinney 2000). To be eligible for this less costly
license, a winery can manufacture no more than 150,000 gallons of wine per year, id.
§ 76-a(7), and may use only New York-grown fruits. Id. § 76-a(5). Thus, out-of-state
wineries are precluded from obtaining the less costly farm winery licenses.
316 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 237.
317 Id. at 238 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970)).
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 See id.
321 Id.
322 See id.
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that a state has core power to regulate importation and distribution of
alcohol while still applying Bacchus.323 As a practical matter, though,
the Seventh and Second Circuits would probably reach the same re-
sult as the other circuits in many direct-shipment cases. It seems fairly
apparent that a direct-shipment law that applied equally to both in-
state and out-of-state producers would survive in most, if not all, of the
circuits that have spoken so far. What remains to be seen is whether
this apparent deference to non-facially discriminatory state liquor dis-
tribution systems is the proper approach.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL
As the recent flurry of circuit court of appeals cases on the subject
would indicate, the validity of state direct-shipment laws is a controver-
sial issue struggling for resolution. The fact that the circuit courts of
appeals have each had a slightly different take, even when using the
same analytical framework, leaves plenty of room for debate as to the
best resolution. Material for that debate can be drawn from history,
alcohol industry materials, academic literature, and numerous other
sources. But since this is a legal controversy, material from the cases
deserves special attention.
A. Basic Observations
Perhaps the most basic observation that can be made in connec-
tion with this subject is that Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment
must do something. One can discern this easily enough from the sim-
ple fact that Section 2 appears in the Constitution. Surely the Seventy-
Second Congress would not have included Section 2 just to provide
interesting material for debate in academic literature and the courts.
That intuition is confirmed by the amount of deliberation Congress
gave Section 2.324 Congress certainly appeared to think it was doing
something worth discussing.
As the history of alcohol regulation in the United States demon-
strates, alcohol has traditionally been somehow "different" from other
products. States feel the need to regulate alcohol in ways that they do
not regulate other products. With the enactment of Section 2, alco-
hol was officially given a special place in the U.S. legal system. Former
White House counsel C. Boyden Gray observed in testimony before
the Federal Trade Commission in 2002 that alcohol is the "sole prod-
323 See infra Part IV.
324 See supra Part I.D.
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uct that has its own constitutional provision."3 25 The courts, too, have
picked up on the fact that Section 2, whatever its precise effect, defi-
nitely makes alcohol somehow "different." As the Seventh Circuit
noted in Bridenbaugh, "§ 2 of the twenty-first amendment empowers
Indiana to control alcohol in ways that it cannot control cheese."3 26
Even in finding that a New York liquor regulation was unconstitu-
tional as applied to Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor's airport operation,
the Supreme Court observed that the Twenty-First Amendment
changed the nature of the inquiry into whether New York had the
power to enforce the law, remarking that "if the commodity involved
here were not liquor, but grain or lumber, the Commerce Clause
would clearly deprive New York of any such power."327 As all of the
foregoing discussion indicates, the ongoing controversy is not over
whether alcohol is different, but rather over exactly how alcohol is
different.
B. The Extent of State Power
Grasping the extent of the states' Twenty-First Amendment
power, and determining whether it extends to cover state direct-ship-
ment laws, is a difficult exercise because no two cases on the subject
are exactly the same. However, it may be possible to piece together
principles from the cases to come up with a coherent rule that can be
applied in direct-shipment cases. Successfully discerning and an-
nouncing such a coherent rule would go far towards clearing up the
current confusion over the extent of the states' regulatory power over
alcohol.
1. States Can Structure Their Own Regulatory Systems
One basic principle that can be gleaned from the cases is that the
states retain the power to structure their own alcohol distribution sys-
tems. The Supreme Court has clearly articulated that principle: "The
Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to struc-
ture the liquor distribution system." 328 States are thus empowered to
establish regulatory schemes to monitor the production of liquor, to
control the movement of liquor through state territory, and to prevent
325 See Garrone, supra note 68, at 66 (reporting Gray's testimony before the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in 2002).
326 Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000).
327 See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
328 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110
(1980).
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the diversion of liquor into the flow of commerce without it first being
subjected to the state's chosen regulatory safeguards. 329 Thus, the
Second Circuit was almost certainly correct when it said that Section 2
effectively "allow[s] states the authority to circumvent dormant Com-
merce Clause protections, provided that they [are] regulating the in-
trastate flow of alcohol."330 To the extent that direct-shipment laws
are a part of the states' alcohol distribution system, they would seem
to represent a permissible exercise of the states' Twenty-First Amend-
ment authority.
Direct-shipment laws are most commonly used by states that use
the three-tier distribution structure. This makes sense because the
purpose of the three-tier system is to control the flow of alcohol by
ensuring that it passes through the regulatory structure, from pro-
ducer to wholesaler to retailer, and only then to consumer. 331 If pro-
ducers were able to ship directly to consumers, however, they would
be able to bypass the regulatory structure entirely.33 2 To prevent this,
states prohibit direct shipments to consumers. It is no accident, then,
that all of the circuit court of appeals cases discussed in Part III came
from states that have three-tier regulatory structures. Direct-shipment
laws are a logical part of such regulatory structures.
It also seems clear that the power to implement a three-tier struc-
ture is well within the "virtually complete" control that states have over
structuring their liquor distribution systems. There are a number of
possible reasons to find the three-tier structure permissible. One rea-
son offered is that Prohibition and other "tumultuous" episodes in the
history of liquor regulation have taught that "liquor control has to be
local to be effective."333 Therefore, states should be allowed to set up
their own systems, including three-tier systems, free from national in-
terference. Another possible reason is that three-tier systems have
been in place for so long. The three-tier system has been in place
since the end of Prohibition 3 34-seventy years now. There is some-
thing that seems manifestly unfair about telling a state that it must
abandon a system it has been allowed to use for so long. If nothing
else, the long, unbroken practice of allowing states to use the three-
329 Spaeth, supra note 9, at 162.
330 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2004):
331 See Martin, supra note 65, at 63-64; Martin, supra note 3, at 27; Foust, supra
note 10, at 666.
332 See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000); Martin,
supra note 65, at 64.
333 Spaeth, supra note 9, at 161.
334 See Martin, supra note 65, at 63; Martin, supra note 3, at 27.
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tier system can be said to have given the three-tier system a "gloss" of
permissibility and made it a valid method of exercising state power.33 5
Still, the best way to think about the three-tier system is that it is
simply among the range of regulatory options that Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment gives the states. 336 Courts addressing
Twenty-First Amendment cases, including those involving direct-ship-
ment laws, have recognized this point. The Fourth Circuit observed
that "[t]he plaintiffs do not challenge North Carolina's three-tiered
system standing alone, perhaps due to their recognition that it is a
long-standing regulatory scheme authorized by the Twenty-first
Amendment."33 7 The Fourth Circuit also concluded that a number of
valid state interests are served by North Carolina's three-tier structure,
including regulating consumption of alcohol, controlling distribution
of alcohol, and collecting taxes on alcohol, among several others. 338
A plurality of the Supreme Court, reviewing laws passed in connection
with North Dakota's three-tier structure, drew similar conclusions: "In
the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market condi-
tions, and raising revenue, the State has established a comprehensive
system for the distribution of liquor within its borders. That system is
unquestionably legitimate."33 9 For some courts, the proposition that
states are authorized to set up a three-tier system is so uncontroversial
that it does not even warrant discussion. For example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted without discussion that, with the exception of its discrimi-
natory exception in favor in-state wineries, Texas's three-tier system
was "otherwise legitimate."340 It is seemingly clear, then, that three-
tier systems, including their constituent direct-shipment laws, are per-
fectly valid. Why, then, have direct-shipment laws been struck down
by four different circuit courts of appeals?
335 Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that longstanding, unquestioned practice by the
executive branch can make such a practice part of the structure of government, even
if it is not explicitly authorized by the Constitution).
336 See Spaeth, supra note 9, at 189.
337 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2003).
338 Id.
339 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion).
Even Justice Scalia, who concurred separately and thereby prevented North Dakota
from being a majority opinion, recognized the constitutional legitimacy of North Da-
kota's three-tier structure, saying that "[t]he Twenty-first Amendment ... empowers
North Dakota to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a
licensed in-state wholesaler. Nothing in our Twenty-first Amendment case law fore-
closes that conclusion." Id. at 447 (Scalia, J., concurring).
340 Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 2003).
1662 [VOL- 79:4
UNMIXING A JURISPRUDENTIAL COCKTAIL
2. The Qualification: State Regulatory Structures Cannot Facially
Discriminate
If it is true that states have "virtually complete" control over how
to structure their liquor distribution systems, and direct-shipment laws
are a constituent part of a commonly used distribution system, direct-
shipment laws seemingly should never be struck down. However, the
fact is that the intermediate federal courts have struck down four such
statutes. It would seem that either the circuit courts of appeals have
gotten it wrong, or the premise that states have the authority to
choose their own liquor control structures is incorrect. Actually,
neither is true. What is true is that while the states have virtually free
reign in structuring their alcohol distribution systems, they cannot im-
plement structures that facially discriminate against out-of-state
liquor.
That conclusion can be supported by reference to the cases. De-
spite the fact that its analytical framework was questionable, the Sev-
enth Circuit was correct when it said that Section 2 authorizes
Indiana's liquor regulations "unless the state has used its power to im-
pose a discriminatory condition on importation, one that favors Indi-
ana sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in other states .... "341
Most of the other federal appeals courts picked up on this point even
while applying the Supreme Court's preferred analytical framework.
This led the Fifth Circuit to adopt, word for word, the quote just cited
when it handed down its decision in Dickerson v. Bailey.3 42 While it
ultimately invalidated Texas's facially discriminatory direct-shipment
law, the Dickerson court did indicate that it is Texas's "prerogative" to
adopt a direct-shipment law that applies equally to both in-state and
out-of-state wineries. 343 Similarly, when analyzing North Carolina's
facially discriminatory direct-shipment laws, the Fourth Circuit said
that "the question is whether discriminating in favor of in-state wineries
by vertically integrating its three-tiered regulatory scheme to their eco-
nomic benefit serves a Twenty-first Amendment interest."344 After
finding that discriminating in favor of in-state wineries with direct-
shipment laws did not serve a Twenty-First Amendment purpose, the
court struck down those aspects that discriminated in favor of in-state
wineries and left the nondiscriminatory aspects of North Carolina's
direct-shipment laws in place.3 45 The Sixth Circuit felt that "[i]t is
341 Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000).
342 Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 401.
343 Id. at 408-09.
344 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003).
345 Id. at 519.
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important to keep in mind that the relevant inquiry is not whether
Michigan's three-tier system as a whole promotes the goals of 'temper-
ance, ensuring an orderly market, and raising revenue,' but whether
the discriminatory scheme challenged in this case ... does so."3 46 It is
worth noting that every state direct-shipment law struck down by a
circuit court of appeals was facially discriminatory. It is also no acci-
dent that every state liquor regulation struck down by the Supreme
Court on dormant Commerce Clause grounds either facially discrimi-
nated against out-of-state beverages,3 47 regulated extraterritorially, 348
or did both. 34
9
3. The Role of Core Purposes
Noticeably absent from the principles discussed so far are core
purposes of the Twenty-First Amendment. It might be objected that a
general rule that states are free to structure their own alcohol regula-
tory systems as long as they do not discriminate against out-of-state
liquor leaves no room for a core purposes inquiry. This would be a
problem because the Supreme Court has clearly demonstrated that
core purposes should be part of the equation. However, such a gen-
eral rule does account for core purposes, at least insofar as the Su-
preme Court articulated them.
It has been observed that the substance of the core purposes test
is not nearly as clear as many courts and commentators seem to be-
lieve.350 The fact that the test requires courts to determine what con-
stitutes a legitimate purpose for state liquor regulations under the
Twenty-First Amendment is extremely problematic. Even in the
Bacchus decision itself, the Supreme Court took note of the fact that
"[n]o clear consensus concerning the meaning" of Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment can be discerned from the legislative history
of the amendment.3 51 Nevertheless, the Court promulgated a test to
determine "whether the principles underlying the Twenty-first
Amendment are sufficiently implicated" by a state's liquor laws to
346 Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir. 2003).
347 See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
348 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986).
349 See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
350 See Miller, supra note 24, at 2543 (pointing out that the substance of the core
purposes test can be derived only from 'Judicial speculation"); Schnabel, supra note
169, at 554-55 (discussing Bridenbaugh and Bainbridge and observing that "the prece-
dential status of the 'core concerns' inquiry is not as clear as either of these two
judges seems to believe").
351 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 274.
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overcome a Commerce Clause violation. 35 2 The problem is that, "[i] n
the absence of any objective indication as to what constitutes the legit-
imate purposes of the Twenty-first Amendment, a court can only offer
subjective judicial speculation regarding the Amendment's
purpose."3
53
Still, "subjective judicial speculation" can be quite persuasive, es-
pecially when it comes from the nation's highest court and pertains to
a constitutional provision. However, the Supreme Court has been less
than unequivocal on this point. The closest that the Bacchus Court
came to stating what it thought the "principles underlying the Twenty-
first Amendment" were was when it said: "Here, the State does not
seek to justify its tax on the ground that it was designed to promote
temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment
.... -354 While the Court made it clear that promoting temperance
was one core concern of the Twenty-First Amendment, it also indi-
cated that there are unspecified "other purposes." No indication is
given as to what those might be.
Six years later, a plurality of the Court proposed some possibili-
ties. The Court upheld two North Dakota liquor laws against a chal-
lenge based on the intergovernmental immunity doctrine and federal
statutory law in North Dakota v. United States.3 55 In explaining its rea-
sons for doing so, the Court said:
The two North Dakota regulations fall within the core of the State's
power under the Twenty-first Amendment. In the interest of pro-
moting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and rais-
ing revenue, the State has established a comprehensive system for
the distribution of liquor within its borders. That system is unques-
tionably legitimate. 35 6
This seems to add "ensuring orderly market conditions" and "raising
revenue" to the list of core purposes of the Twenty-First Amendment.
Aside from the fact that North Dakota is a plurality opinion, there are a
couple of problems. One is that the Court never indicated how it
came to the conclusion that these were core purposes.3 57 It would be
far more satisfying if the Court would have at least given the sources of
its determination. Also, it is entirely unclear what the Court meant by
"ensuring orderly market conditions." Thus, when Florida attempted
352 Id. at 275.
353 Miller, supra note 24, at 2543.
354 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
355 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (plurality opinion).
356 Id. at 432 (plurality opinion).
357 See Miller, supra note 24, at 2545.
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to justify its discriminatory direct-shipment regulation by citing its in-
terest in "ensuring orderly markets," the Eleventh Circuit expressed
confusion about that phrase's meaning.358 Finally, almost any imagi-
nable liquor regulation could be justified as either "ensuring orderly
market conditions" or "raising revenue," including discriminatory di-
rect-shipment laws and Hawaii's discriminatory excise tax.359 There-
fore, it seems that more consideration of the substance of the core
purposes test is needed.
The best way to give core purposes more consideration is to re-
turn to Bacchus and see if the Court made any unequivocal statement
about the core purposes test. The Court did indeed do so when it
explained that "[d] oubts about the scope of the Amendment's author-
ization notwithstanding, one thing is certain: The central purpose of the
provision was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by
erecting barriers to competition."3 60 In light of that statement, it
seems that the best way to read Bacchus is in the negative. The Bacchus
Court did not tell future courts to look to the core purposes of the
Twenty-First Amendment for affirmative justifications for state liquor
regulations. What it did require was that courts should not uphold
state laws that certainly do not fall under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment's authorization, i.e., those that constitute mere protectionism in
favor of local liquor. The Swedenburg court noted this, saying: "The
Supreme Court has ... viewed with caution state attempts to invoke
section 2 as a pretext for economic protectionism."3 6 1 Thus, the
Twenty-First Amendment authorizes states to set up their own liquor
distribution systems, but certainly does not authorize them to do so in
a way that discriminates against out-of-state liquor in favor of in-state
liquor.362
358 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11th Cir. 2002).
359 This may have been exactly what was intended. The plurality opinion in North
Dakota was authored by Justice Stevens. One may recall thatJustice Stevens also wrote
a dissenting opinion in Bacchus to express a very broad view of the states' power to
regulate alcohol. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 278-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra note
159.
360 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
361 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 236 (2d Cir. 2004).
362 And one could just as easily conclude that, two years later, the Court added
another type of measure that the Twenty-First Amendment certainly did not author-
ize: those state laws that have the effect of regulating liquor in other states. This is
exceedingly rational, as it would be hard to believe that the Twenty-First Amendment
would authorize states to intrude upon other states' Twenty-First Amendment author-
ity. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585
(1986).
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This reading meshes well with the principles discussed above.
The Twenty-First Amendment authorizes states to structure their own
liquor regulation systems. In essence, structuring state liquor control
systems is a core purpose of the amendment. 363 Measures that are an
integral part of the state's chosen structure, like direct-shipment laws,
should be presumed valid. However, direct-shipment laws that facially
discriminate against out-of-state liquor are struck down. The reason:
The Twenty-First Amendment did not empower the states to enact
protectionist measures that favor local liquor. The fact that a direct-
shipment law is facially discriminatory can be seen as leading to a re-
buttable presumption that the state regulatory structure is tailored for
protectionist, and thus improper, purposes.3 6 4 This presumption
could be rebutted by the state if it proves that the challenged discrimi-
natory law was enacted for core Twenty-First Amendment purposes.
For example, in Swedenburg, the court acknowledged that New York's
physical presence requirement might work a hardship on out-of-state
wineries, but was able to conclude that the law was not enacted with a
protectionist purpose because the physical presence requirement was
in place only to ensure the integrity of New York's regulatory sys-
tem.365 Notably, the circuit courts of appeals, in all of the cases with
the exception of Bridenbaugh, have applied the core purposes test af-
ter finding the state law to be facially discriminatory. Otherwise, a
state's chosen regulatory scheme should be presumed valid, as per the
discussion above.3 66
This reading would be consistent with everything the circuit
courts of appeals have done. When the Eleventh Circuit says "[a] s for
363 This is probably what Justice Stevens meant when he identified "ensuring or-
derly market conditions" as a core concern. See North Dakota v. United States, 495
U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion).
364 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to adopt a similar view:
Against the backdrop of its general prohibition of direct shipment of alco-
holic beverages, North Carolina's authorization of in-state direct shipment
of wine-which has the effect of increasing access to wine produced only in
North Carolina-cannot credibly be portrayed as anything other than local
economic boosterism in the guise of a law aimed at alcoholic beverage
control.
Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003).
Thus, the Fourth Circuit created a dichotomy between alcoholic beverage con-
trol laws (presumably proper under the Twenty-First Amendment) and laws aimed at
economic protectionism (presumably improper under the Twenty-First Amendment,
even when they affect alcoholic beverages).
365 Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 238. Note, however, that the Swedenburg court did not
explicitly find that the New York statute was facially discriminatory.
366 See supra Part IV.B.1.
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'ensuring orderly markets,' we are not sure what that phrase means,
but it certainly does not mean discrimination in a way that effectively
forecloses out-of-state firms from the Florida market," it seems to hint
at the proposed reading.367 So does the Fourth Circuit, when it lists
six valid reasons for North Carolina's three-tier structure, including its
direct-shipment laws, but still strikes down the discriminatory portions
of the law because "discriminating in favor of in-state wineries by verti-
cally integrating its three-tiered regulatory scheme to their economic
benefit" does not serve a Twenty-First Amendment interest.368 In
sum, this interpretation is consistent with the holdings in all of the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause/Twenty-First Amendment cases
and in all of the circuit court cases to date.
To return to a point raised earlier, there seems to be some confu-
sion, at least among the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, as to whether non-
facially discriminatory direct-shipment laws are valid because they do
not violate the Commerce Clause, or rather because they are author-
ized by the Twenty-First Amendment.369 The better view seems to be
that they are authorized by the Twenty-First Amendment, as part of
the state's right to structure its own liquor distribution system, so long
as it does not structure that system in a way that constitutes mere pro-
tectionism. This is so because there is at least a colorable claim that
even nondiscriminatory state laws could violate the Commerce
Clause.3 70 The reason they should survive is that they are a valid exer-
cise of the states' Twenty-First Amendment power.
To summarize: All states are entitled to set up their own alcohol
distribution structure. Some states choose to enact direct-shipment
laws to protect the integrity of their chosen structures. As long as
those laws do not discriminate against out-of-state producers, they are
a valid part of the states' core Twenty-First Amendment authority. If
those laws do discriminate, however, they are presumed to be enacted
for an improper protectionist purpose, and can only be saved if the
state can demonstrate that the law serves a core purpose of the
Twenty-First Amendment.
C. Objections and Answers
Although direct-shipment laws have long been part of state regu-
latory systems (especially the prevalent three-tier distribution system),
there are many commentators who argue that all direct-shipment laws
367 See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11th Cir. 2002).
368 Beskind, 325 F.3d at 516-17.
369 See supra text accompanying notes 237-40.
370 See infra Part I.C.
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are invalid. These commentators generally focus on traditional Com-
merce Clause principles and on the nature of the contemporary alco-
holic beverages industry to support positions that would severely limit
the states' power to manage their alcohol distribution systems.
The basic premise behind the case against direct-shipment laws is
the contention that all direct-shipping laws place impermissible re-
straints on interstate commerce. Direct-shipment laws are said to be
"per se violations of the Commerce Clause in that they directly regu-
late interstate commerce and demonstrate a purpose to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests." 37' By enforcing the
three-tiered system and prohibiting direct shipments from out-of-state
producers, it is argued, states exclude family wineries and other small
liquor producers who cannot find wholesalers in certain states' mar-
kets.3 72 This increases the market share controlled by local industry,
because all alcoholic beverage sales must be channeled through "es-
tablished local distributors."3 73
This argument, however, completely ignores the fact that the
Twenty-First Amendment does something to make alcohol different.
Taking away the states' ability to pass evenhanded direct-shipment
laws takes a major step toward robbing the Twenty-First Amendment
of all meaning. If states had to justify even nondiscriminatory regula-
tions, one would be hard pressed to identify any way that alcohol is
different from any other article of commerce. Moreover, this argu-
ment does not account for the fact that the Supreme Court has af-
firmed the states' right to structure their own liquor distribution
systems. Striking down evenhanded direct-shipment laws would leave
the structures chosen by many states extremely vulnerable to circum-
vention. Therefore, it almost certainly cannot be true that all direct-
shipment laws are unconstitutional.
The general anti-direct-shipment law view is supported by several
more-specific arguments. One of the most prevalent is the argument
that direct-shipment laws are imposed on the rest of society by special
interests-namely wholesalers and distributors eager to maintain con-
trol of the liquor market. Opponents of direct-shipment laws point
out that most states do not have many wineries, microbreweries, or
371 Shanker, supra note 84, at 379; see also Molnar, supra note 7, at 186 (character-
izing direct shipment laws as placing "substantial burdens on interstate commerce
that are inimical to established constitutional principles").
372 Douglass, supra note 6, at 1622.
373 Molnar, supra note 7, at 187; see also Douglass, supra note 6, at 1625-27 (com-
paring three-tiered systems to C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383
(1994), a Supreme Court case rejecting non-facially discriminatory state laws that have
the effect of channeling transactions through local businesses).
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other types of small producers that would substantially benefit from
the ability to ship directly to consumers. The vast majority of those
states do have wholesalers who would like to hold on to their shares of
the market. 3 74 It is undeniable that wholesalers are the biggest losers
when direct-shipment laws are struck down. The typical wholesaler's
share of the price of a bottle of wine is eighteen to twenty-five percent.
This is more than double the cut of distributors in the food indus-
try. 3 7 5 Direct-shipment law opponents point out that wholesalers have
well funded and well connected lobbies that are able to convince legis-
lators to push for strict enforcement of direct-shipment laws.3 76 It has
been noted with some suspicion that these lobbying efforts coincided
with the rise of e-commerce, with the Internet threatening to provide
a convenient connection between consumers and liquor producers.3 77
The clear implication of this aspect of the anti-direct-shipment law
position is that direct-shipment laws have an unworthy or improper
purpose, and should therefore be struck down.3 78
The other major force behind direct-shipment prohibitions, it is
argued, is the states themselves. Many states see direct shipment of
alcoholic beverages as a threat to revenue. States collect substantial
revenue from excise taxes on alcohol, with collections in the tens and
even hundreds of millions of dollars.3 79 States fear that if producers
were able to avoid three-tier systems by shipping directly to consum-
ers, it would become much more difficult for them to collect taxes.
Therefore, opponents argue, direct-shipment bans are a self-serving
way for states to preserve their revenues.3 80
Opponents of direct-shipment laws also argue that such laws dis-
proportionately victimize certain groups of people. The most com-
monly cited victims are small, family wineries and wine enthusiasts. As
the number of small-scale domestic producers has risen, many of
them have found that they are unable to sell their products in some
states. Wholesalers prefer to work with larger producers so that they
can enjoy economies of scale. 381 In 1999, 37% of all vintners reported
374 See Silvernail, supra note 13, at 546-47; Garrone, supra note 68, at 65-66.
375 See Martin, supra note 3, at 5; Freedman & Emshwiller, supra note 7.
376 See Martin, supra note 3, at 5-6.
377 See Silvernail, supra note 13, at 546.
378 For the most detailed explication of this position, see generally Shanker, supra
note 84, at 361-69 (conducting a public choice theory analysis of state direct-ship-
ment bans and concluding that the analysis reveals that direct-shipment laws have an
improper protectionist purpose).
379 See Molnar, supra note 7, at 180.
380 See Molnar, supra note 7, at 180; Silvernail, supra note 13, at 546-47.
381 See Martin, supra note 65, at 68-69; Garrone, supra note 68, at 64.
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that they were unable to sell their products in at least some states be-
cause they were unable to interest a wholesaler in distributing their
wines.3 8 2 Direct- shipment provides a way for these vintners to reach
customers they might not otherwise be able to reach. They obviously
cannot do so in states with direct-shipment laws. Connoisseurs are the
other commonly cited victim of direct-shipment laws. If certain winer-
ies cannot reach particular states, the flipside is that consumers in
those states often cannot find the wines they desire. 383 This particu-
larly affects oenophiles, since the average consumer is content with
the wines that are distributed through the states' three-tier systems. 384
The basic argument here is that the law needs to recognize the reality
these victims face, and direct-shipment laws should consequently be
struck down across the board.
The improper beneficiaries and improper purposes arguments
can be countered on several fronts. First, in many states, three-tier
systems and direct-shipment laws date all the way back to the end of
Prohibition. These laws were enacted to keep the liquor industry out
of the hands of the Mafia or any other large business that might create
a "liquor empire" like those present during Prohibition. They were
also intended to forestall aggressive marketing and price cutting mea-
sures by keeping liquor businesses from controlling all major stages of
the distribution process (production, wholesale, and retail). This, it
was hoped, would keep liquor consumption under control.3 5 There
can be no argument that these are compelling state interests. Excise
taxes are also important to the states. Alcohol is among the consumer
items that brings in the most taxes for states, and it is therefore very
important to the states that they be able to collect the taxes on alco-
hol.3 86 Direct-shipment bans facilitate tax collection by channeling li-
quor through the state regulatory system. Yearly losses to the states
from direct-shipment of alcohol have been estimated as being from
anywhere in the tens of millions of dollars all the way up to $600 mil-
lion.3 8 7 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals offered the following list
of valid justifications: "regulating the consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages, channeling the distribution of alcoholic beverages, enforcing a
minimum age for the purchase and consumption of such beverages,
limiting the location from where they are sold, controlling the con-
382 Freedman & Emshwiller, supra note 7.
383 See Douglass, supra note 6, at 1622; Kozusko, supra note 7, at 101.
384 See Martin, supra note 65, at 69.
385 Martin, supra note 65, at 63-64; Martin, supra note 3, at 27-28.
386 See Garrone, supra note 68, at 65.
387 See Martin, supra note 3, at 8.
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tents of such beverages, and collecting taxes in connection with their
sale and distribution. '3 8 8
All of these justifications make it difficult to argue that direct-
shipment laws solely exist as a way to advantage wholesalers and state
governments. As one commentator on this subject has pointed out, it
is difficult to say what prompts a legislature to vote a certain way.
While one legislator might be motivated by a desire to help wholesal-
ers, another might feel that direct shipments make it easier for minors
to access alcohol (whether that is true or not). One legislator may
even have multiple reasons for supporting a law. Because the legisla-
ture is made up of many different people with many different motiva-
tions, any effort to point to one reason why the legislature passed a
certain law is folly.38 9 It is not folly to try to determine what the law is,
however, and in this case the law allows nondiscriminatory direct-ship-
ment laws. If the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes nondiscrimina-
tory direct-shipment laws, it does not matter who the beneficiaries are;
the fact is that the states have the power and have chosen to use it.
Then there is the implied charge that states are only enforcing
their direct-shipment laws more stringently now because they fear that
the Internet will lead to a rise in direct shipping. First of all, the fact
that an innovation increases the risk that a law will be violated is a
perfectly legitimate reason for a state to heighten its enforcement ef-
forts. Second, it may actually be direct-shipment law opponents who
expect things to change because of the Internet. There seems to be a
certain amount of sentiment that the Internet has changed things,
and that the old rules do not apply.390 However, there is no reason
why everything that is capable of being sold over the Internet should
therefore be unrestricted. The old rules still do apply, and states re-
main just as free to enforce their alcohol regulatory systems as they
were before the advent of the Internet.391
As for the argument that certain groups are disproportionately
victimized, it too says nothing about the legal status of direct shipping
laws. As the Second Circuit argued: "Changes in marketing tech-
niques or national consumer demand for a product do not alter the
meaning of a constitutional amendment. 3 92 The argument is also
388 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2003).
389 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 24, at 2547-48.
390 Denning, supra note 116, at 336.
391 See id.; see alsoJack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 823-25 (2001) (explaining that the fact that the
communication before a sale took place over the Internet does not change the nature
of the legal inquiry into whether the state may regulate that sale).
392 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 239 (2d Cir. 2004).
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somewhat disingenuous. While it is true that wholesaler groups can
wield great influence in many states, wineries and other small produc-
ers are hardly helpless. Wineries have their own industry groups, such
as the American Vintners Association and the Wine Institute, which
are active in lobbying and in litigation efforts. 393 They have also been
supported by e-commerce groups like the Association for Interactive
Media, which has a list of members including the New York Times, the
Chicago Tribune, Intel, and Yahoo!. These groups fear that if states are
allowed to limit online wine sales, it will be easier for states to place
limits on other types of e-commerce. 394 Finally, the purpose of gov-
ernment is not to try to create the mix of laws that best accommodates
small wineries and wine connoisseurs. The purpose is to create laws
that benefit society as a whole, and the U.S. government decided sev-
enty years ago that local control of alcohol regulation works best.
3 95 If
wineries and oenophiles suffer harms as a result, it is unfortunate, but
it does not change the law.
Another prevalent argument invoked against direct-shipment
laws is that they do not serve the core purposes of the Twenty-First
Amendment and should therefore be invalidated in all cases. Oppo-
nents generally characterize the states as offering two main justifica-
tions for direct-shipment laws: raising revenue and preventing
underage drinking. Opponents attempt to prove that direct-shipment
laws do not promote those goals. As to the first justification, revenue,
opponents argue that state losses from direct shipments are minimal,
as most liquor is still sold through the three-tier system and alcohol
taxes account for only a small percentage of state incomes in the first
place. 39 6 Moreover, some argue, states face difficulty collecting taxes
on out-of-state purchases of other goods, and there is no logical rea-
son why states have any more right to collect taxes on alcohol than on
any other good.39 7 The argument is also made that states are cur-
rently working on efforts to find ways to tax Internet and mail order
transactions, and that whatever solutions the states find could then be
393 See Garrone, supra note 68, at 67.
394 See Martin, supra note 3, at 8.
395 See, e.g., Spaeth, supra note 9, at 203 ("As this country learned through the
temperance embroilments of the 1880s and Prohibition, liquor is like nothing else.
For no other item is state and local control so necessary, and for no other item does
the United States Constitution expressly provide for state control.").
396 See Douglass, supra note 6, at 1652; Martin, supra note 65, at 95; Molnar, supra
note 7, at 180.
397 See Foust, supra note 10, at 691; Molnar, supra note 7, at 180; Shanker, supra
note 84, at 358.
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applied to direct shipments of liquor.398 According to direct-ship-
ment law opponents, all of this proves that direct-shipment laws are
either ineffective at, or unnecessary to, raising state revenue.
Opponents also say that the justification of preventing underage
access to alcohol is equally unavailing. They point out that it would be
much easier for a teen to obtain false identification and go to a liquor
store. This is so because Internet wine purchases generally take sev-
eral days before the product arrives. Also, wine purchased online is
generally more expensive boutique and gift-type wine that is beyond
the liquor budgets of most teens.39 9 Moreover, it is argued, the goal
of preventing access to minors can be achieved by less restrictive
means-one solution would be for carriers to require identification
and adult signatures upon delivery.400 Indeed, some common carriers
have already put into place special safeguards for delivery of alcoholic
beverages. 401
Once again, these arguments can be answered by reference to the
list of proper purposes mentioned above. However, the most impor-
tant point is that these arguments focus on proving that the state's
regulatory efforts are unnecessary or ineffective, when the real point is
whether the state is authorized to use those measures. The fact is that
the states have the right to set up their own liquor regulatory systems.
That right does not hinge on the effectiveness or the necessity of a
state's chosen regulatory system. It might make a difference if a state's
chosen regulatory system was facially discriminatory, but that is not
the argument here. Just because direct-shipment law opponents can
raise doubts about two common justifications for direct-shipment laws
does not change the fact that the Twenty-First Amendment gives states
the right to enact non-facially discriminatory direct-shipment laws.
While many objections are raised over nondiscriminatory direct-
shipment laws, the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes the states to
set up their own liquor regulatory structure. It may be true that small
wineries are the unfortunate victims of such laws, but that does not
change the extent of the states' Twenty-First Amendment power. As
long as state direct-shipment laws are not facially discriminatory and
thus clearly protectionist, they are a valid part of the states' regulatory
regimes, and should be upheld.
398 See Martin, supra note 65, at 95-96; Douglass, supra note 6, at 1652.
399 See Martin, supra note 65, at 93-94; Foust, supra note 10, at 690; Molnar, supra
note 7, at 179-80.
400 See Douglass, supra note 6, at 1652; Foust, supra note 10, at 691.
401 See Martin, supra note 3, at 7.
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CONCLUSION
While wineries and oenophiles have had some success in having
discriminatory direct-shipment laws struck down, the fight has only
just begun. If recent history is any indication, more states will find
themselves in court defending their direct-shipment laws. Moreover,
even nondiscriminatory direct-shipment laws may soon be subject to
challenge, since they are as harmful to out-of-state wineries as discrim-
inatory laws.
If, however, recent cases and Supreme Court precedent are to be
reconciled, courts must reach different results in cases where direct-
shipment laws discriminate and cases where the laws do not discrimi-
nate. By doing so, courts will be mindful of the states' Twenty-First
Amendment right to structure their own alcohol regulatory systems.
They will also be mindful of the fact that the Twenty-First Amendment
does not exist to excuse bald protectionism. While small wineries and
wine collectors may not like it, that is the law, forged by history, inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, and hopefully to be applied by the
courts in the future.
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